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TAMING BLOCKBUSTER PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AWARDS
Benjamin J. McMichael*
W Kip Viscusi**

Blockbuster punitive damages awards, i.e., those awards exceeding
$100 million, attract attention based on their sheer size. While there have
been fewer such awards in the last decade, they remain an importantpresence in the legal landscape. Taking notice of these and other largepunitive
damages awards, courts and state policymakers have taken steps to both
constrain them and render them more predictable. States have enactedpunitive damages caps to limit the amount of punitive damages courts can
award, but these caps often contain a number of exceptions and apply only
to damages under a specific state's law. At a broader level, the Supreme
Court has announced a general limitation on punitive damages under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to all
cases and containsfew exceptions. Under State Farm v. Campbell, punitive
damages awards that exceed the accompanying compensatory award by
more than afactor often will generally violate dueprocess. This limit, however, is substantially higher than the punitive damages caps that some
states have put in place.
This Article provides the first empiricalanalysis of the effect of state
punitive damages caps on blockbuster awards and offers the first comparison of the effect of these reforms with the effect of the Supreme Court's
current constitutional doctrine on punitive damages. Understanding the
roles of these legal regimes in how the largestpunitive damages awards
are imposedprovides unique insight into how diferentfactors affect courts'
decisions to awardpunitive damages. Relying on this insight, as well as
previously developed empirical evidence, we argue that it is time for a new
constitutionaldoctrine on punitive damages. In particular, we argue that
the Supreme Court should incorporatethe lessons learnedfrom the diferent effects of statepunitive damages caps to lower the limit placed on punitive damages under the Due Process Clause. For cases involvingfinancial loss, punitive awards that are more than three times the size of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Hugh F. Culverhouse Jr. School of Law at the University of Alabama. We
wish to thank participants at the Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting for helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article.
.
University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management, Vanderbilt University Law
School.
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accompanyingcompensatory awardwill generally violate due process. For
cases involving severe injuries, such as wrongful deaths, the total value of
punitive damages and compensatory damages should not exceed economic
estimates of the value of a statistical life, which is an economic deterrence
measure. This proposedstructure would better achieve the Court'sgoal of
returningpredictabilityto punitive damages awards, blockbuster and otherwise.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Talcum powder is a remarkably common substance. Whether applying it as
part of an infant's care routine, having it brushed on following a haircut, or using
it in hundreds of other ways, talcum powder has been an important presence in
American life for many years. As such, it may have been surprising that a California jury awarded $347 million in punitive damages to punish Johnson & Johnson for failing to warn consumers about the links between talcum powder and
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cancer.' While such a large punitive damages award-accompanying, in this
case, a $70 million compensatory damages award 2-may be unusual, such extreme awards are not unprecedented. In fact, while this award would qualify as a
"blockbuster punitive damages award" because it exceeds $100 million, it does
not even rank among the forty largest punitive damages awards. 3 Even if the
award had been ten times its current size, the talcum powder award would still
not make the top five punitive damages awards.
Because of their extreme size and their concomitant ability to influence the
behavior of potential defendants, blockbuster awards such as the talcum powder
award have received substantial attention from courts, policymakers, and scholars.4 While these awards may be justified as necessary to punish particularly reprehensible conduct and deter its repetition in the future, courts have expressed
concern over the predictability of punitive damages awards in general because
imposing large awards on defendants with little prior warning undermines
"[e]lementary notions of fairness." 5 In an effort to preserve these notions of fairness and return a degree of predictability to punitive damages, the Supreme Court
has on several occasions addressed punitive damages awards under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 Currently, the Court's constitutional
doctrine on punitive damages centers around a limit on the ratio between punitive
damages and compensatory damages announced in State Farm v. Campbell.7
There, the Court held that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy

1. Richard Winton, L.A. Jury Hits Johnson & Johnson with $417-Million Verdict over CancerLink to its
Talc, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017, 2:50 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-cancer-talc-verdict20170821-story.html. The Los Angeles Superior Court later granted the defendant's motion for a new trial based
on a lack of specific causation with respect to the alleged injuries. Joe Mullin, Judge Overturns $417M Verdict
Over Johnson & Johnson Baby Powder, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 24, 2017, 4:58 PM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2017/10/judge-overtums-417m-verdict-over-johnson-johnson-baby-powder/. After the California case, a
Missouri jury imposed a $4.69 billion punitive damages award on Johnson & Johnson based on findings that its
talc-based baby powder products contained asbestos, which caused women to develop ovarian cancer. Tina Bellon, Jury OrdersJ&Jto Pay $4.7 Billion in Missouri Asbestos Cancer Case, REUTERS (July 12, 2018, 3:38 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-cancer-lawsuit/jury-orders-jj-to-pay-550-million-in-missouri-asbestos-cancer-case-idUSKBN1 K234U.
2. Winton, supra note 1.
3. Any punitive damages award exceeding $100 million qualifies as a "blockbuster award." For previous
work on blockbuster awards and the coining of the "blockbuster punitive damages award" designation, see Alison
F. Del Rossi & W. Kip Viscusi, The ChangingLandscape ofBlockbuster PunitiveDamagesAwards, 12 AM. L.
ECON. REv. 116 (2010); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, PunitiveDamages:How Judges and Juries Perform, 33
J.L. STUD. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Hersch & Viscusi, Punitive Damages]; W. Kip Viscusi & Benjamin J. McMichael, Shifting the Fat-TailedDistributionofBlockbuster Punitive DamagesAwards, 11 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD.
350, 363-64 (2014) [hereinafter Viscusi & McMichael, Shifting the Fat-TailedDistribution];W. Kip Viscusi,
The Blockbuster Punitive DamagesAwards, 53 EMORY L.J. 1405 (2004).

4.

See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346(2007) (representing one instance of an appel-

late analysis of a blockbuster award); Viscusi & McMichael, Shifting the Fat-TailedDistribution,supra note 3,
at 363 (analyzing the fat tailed distributions of blockbuster awards).

5.

BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).

6.

See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.

Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
7.

State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425-26.
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due process."8 Effectively, the Court held that the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages could not exceed 10:1.9
Beyond the Court's attempts to rein in large punitive damages awards, individual states have taken legislative action by capping punitive damages at a
specific dollar amount or at a multiple of the accompanying compensatory
award.10 These caps are often set much lower than the ratio limit imposed in State
Farm, placing stricter limits on punitive awards. For example, Colorado allows
a ratio of no more than 1:1.11 However, unlike the Court's limit, which applies
to any punitive damages award imposed in the United States, state caps apply
only to cases under a specific state's law (and sometimes only to a subset of
cases). 12 Also, unlike the Court's limit, state caps often contain specific exceptions that allow courts to impose awards in excess of the cap amount.13
In general, State Farm and punitive damages caps have different strengths
and weaknesses, and the differential impact of these two legal regimes on punitive damages awards can elucidate which factors are most salient in both limiting
punitive damages awards and rendering them more predictable. There is very
little empirical evidence, however, on the comparative effect of these two regimes.14 Importantly, no prior work has examined the impact of punitive damages caps on the punitive damages awards most likely to violate notions of fairness or otherwise attract attention-the blockbuster awards. The principal
contributions of this Article are to provide the first empirical evidence on the
effect of punitive damages caps on blockbuster awards as well as evidence on
the comparative effects of caps and the ratio limit announced in State Farm.
Estimating a series of multivariate regression models, we analyze the effect
of both State Farm and punitive damages caps to find that, consistent with their
different structures, they have different restraining effects on blockbuster
awards. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that State Farm has reduced both
the frequency with which punitive awards over $100 million have been imposed

8. Id. at 425; see also id. ("When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only
equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.").
9. Because the Court offered no specific numbers, the most conservative interpretation ofthe "single digit

ratio" is 10:1 because, technically, 9.99 is a single digit and 9.99 = 10. See id. ("Single-digit multipliers are
more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than
awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1[.]").
10. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b (2015) (limiting punitive damages to twice the amount of compensatory damages); IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4 (2018) (limiting punitive damages to the greater of $50,000 or three
times the compensatory award).
11. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (2018). This ratio increases to 3:1 in limited circumstances. Id.
12. See, e.g., State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.

13.

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 768.73, 768.735, 768.736 (2018) (allowing the cap on punitive damages to

increase in specific situations).
14. To date, some work has independently evaluated punitive damages caps and State Farm, but only one
study has examined the two regimes together. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury Dif
ference in Punitive Damages Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. EMPtUCAL L. STUD. 325,346-52
(2011) (examining the effect of State Farm on a national sample of punitive damages awards). But see Benjamin
J. McMichael & W. Kip Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus: The Differential Incidence of State Punitive
Damages Reforms, 84 S. ECON. J. 82, 93 (2017) [hereinafter McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damage Calculus] (studying the effect of punitive damages caps and State Farm in the same empirical models).
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as well as the size of those blockbuster awards that are imposed. In contrast, the
findings reported here indicate that punitive damages caps only have an effect on
the frequency of these awards, suggesting that their effect is limited to preventing
awards from crossing the $100 million threshold (i.e., having no effect on the
size of the awards that cross this threshold). Interestingly, this evidence contrasts
somewhat with prior empirical evidence derived from a national sample of punitive damages awards, i.e., a sample of "typical" awards.15 This earlier evidence
suggests that State Farm has little effect on either the frequency with which punitive damages are imposed or the size of these awards, while caps have a statistically significant and negative impact on award size. 16
This contrast in empirical findings provides a unique opportunity to consider which aspects of a limitation on punitive damages are most effective. In
particular, the effect of State Farm on large awards (and the absence of an effect
on small awards) and the effect of caps on small awards (with less of an effect
on large awards) offers insight into how the Supreme Court might refine its current doctrine on punitive damages to better achieve its goal of rendering these
awards more predictable. And we argue that, if the Court takes this goal of restraining such outlier awards seriously, it should take advantage of the available
empirical evidence to formulate a new approach to governing punitive damages
under the Due Process Clause. By lowering the current ratio limit from 10:1 to
3:1 for damages relating to financial harm, the Court could maintain the current
doctrine's efficacy in limiting large awards but better restrain (and thus render
more predictable) smaller punitive damages awards in the same way state punitive damages caps do. For damages pertaining to fatalities and serious bodily
injuries, a total damages cap based on the value of a statistical life can serve as
the pertinent deterrence-based measure of damages. To be sure, limiting punitive
damages will decrease the penalties for purposes of punishing and deterring reprehensible behavior, but the Court has made clear that it is willing to trade off
punishment and deterrence for predictability.' 7 And, from the standpoint of deterrence, the pertinent objective should be to provide economically efficient levels of deterrence that are commensurate with the magnitude of the harms. Taking
seriously the Court's statements on predictability, then, we offer new insight
based on empirical evidence into how the Court may better achieve predictability
in punitive damages.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II engages with the
legal and economic theories of punitive damages, as well as the existing evidence
as to the predictability of these awards. Part III discusses the 137 blockbuster
awards we have found, including many that have not been identified in previous

15. McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 93-95. By "typical," we
mean awards that are imposed in a large sample of all case types. We do not mean to imply that punitive damages
are at all typical. Indeed, they are imposed in less than 5% of all cases. Id. at 92.
16. Id. at 94.
17. We do not offer a normative argument that limiting the ability of punitive damages to punish and deter
reprehensible conduct is, on balance, best for society. Instead, we argue that, if the goal is to increase predictability, our proposal can achieve that goal.
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studies. Part IV provides the first empirical analysis of the effect of punitive damages caps on these awards and offers a comparison between this effect and the
impact of State Farm. Part V analyzes this evidence along with prior evidence to
arrive at a specific suggestion for how the Court can update the current punitive
damages doctrine to better achieve its goal of predictability, while maintaining
meaningful economic sanctions.
II.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THEORY, FRAMEWORK, AND EVIDENCE

Punitive damages occupy a unique place in the United States legal system.
Unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages do not exist to compensate injured parties.18 While they are not equivalent to full criminal sanctions, 9 punitive
damages, as their name suggests, exist to punish reprehensible conduct. 2 0 They
also have a general deterrence role by serving to deter others from engaging in
similar conduct in the future. 21 They accomplish these twin goals by forcing defendants to internalize costs associated with their actions above and beyond the
amount required to compensate victims. The Supreme Court has explicitly limited punitive damages to these goals. 2 2 But before detailing the legal framework
in which punitive damages are awarded, we examine the means by which they
accomplish the goals of punishment and deterrence. Specifically, we review the
economic theory of punitive damages, which clarifies how punitive damages
function in the legal system.
A.

The Roles ofPunitive Damages: The Economic Theory

The manner in which punitive damages accomplish the goal of punishment
is straightforward. Defendants would obviously prefer to pay less in damages,
and by increasing award amounts, courts can punish defendants. The manner in
which punitive damages accomplish the goal of deterrence, however, is not as
straightforward. The key to understanding the role of punitive damages in deterrence is appreciating that not every wrongdoer is held liable for his or her actions.23 Because of this, these wrongdoers may engage in conduct that is harmful

18. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) ("[Punitive damages]
operate as 'private fines' intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing.").
19. See id. (noting that punitive damages "have been described as 'quasi-criminal"'); see also Pac. Mut.

Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
20. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("[Punitive damages] are not compensation for
injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future
occurrence.").

21.

Id.; see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("Punitive damages may properly

be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.").

22.

See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.

23. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages:An Economic Analysis, 111IHARV. L.
REV. 869, 888 (1998) (explaining reasons wrongdoers escape liability for their actions). See generally STEVEN
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 244 (2004) (explaining how punitive damages account for the probability that a wrongdoer will not be caught).
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to others because it simply "isn't worth it" to take the precautions necessary to
avoid harming others.
For example, suppose Chemicorp, Inc., manufactures chemicals for use in
industrial processes. In so doing, it produces harmful byproducts that it can either
store onsite or safely dispose of through a special procedure, which converts the
byproducts into harmless substances. Chemicorp has not invested the $5 million
necessary to buy the equipment required to complete the safe disposal procedure
and is currently deciding whether to do so. Chemicorp knows that if it stores the
byproducts onsite, they will eventually leak out of their containment vessels and
cause $10 million worth of harm to the surrounding community-though, it
keeps this knowledge a closely guarded secret. Given the nature of the harm and
the nuances of the legal system, Chemicorp knows that it faces only a 40%
chance of liability for this $10 million harm.24
Thus, Chemicorp faces the following investment decision with respect to
the safe disposal procedure. It can pay the $5 million necessary to begin the safe
disposal procedure or it can roll the dice that it will not be held liable for the $10
million harm it knows will eventually occur if it stores the byproducts onsite.
The expected cost of this gamble is only $4 million since there is only a 40%
25
chance that Chemicorp will be required to compensate the victims. Comparing
the $5 million cost of investing in the safe disposal procedure with the $4 million
expected cost of storing the harmful byproducts onsite, Chemicorp's profit-maximizing choice is clear-store the products onsite, despite this resulting in a $10
million harm to the surrounding community.
While this choice is clear from Chemicorp's perspective, it is equally
clearly the wrong choice from society's perspective. By investing $5 million in
the safe disposal procedure, Chemicorp could avoid a $10 million harm to society. From a social perspective, Chemicorp could generate $5 million in value for
society by paying $5 million to avoid a harm of $10 million. The problem, of
course, is that Chemicorp does not compare $10 million to $5 million but the $4
million expected cost of liability to the $5 million certain cost of investing. From
the perspective of deterrence, the legal system's job is to align Chemicorp's incentives with those of society's so that it makes the right social choice. Yet by
only awarding compensatory damages-here $10 million-if Chemicorp is held
liable, courts cannot force Chemicorp to internalize the full cost of the harm it is
imposing on society. Chemicorp will always discount the compensatory damages
by the probability that it is held liable for those damages, so the legal system
essentially has two options to increase Chemicorp's cost of storing the byproducts onsite-increase the probability of being held liable or increase the damages
Chemicorp must pay if it is held liable.
The first option (increasing the probability of liability) may be feasible in
the criminal context where the legal system may be able to increase policing or
24. This 40% chance could be due to the difficulty in tracing any harm to Chemicorp's actions. Perhaps
the byproducts cause types of cancer that are both difficult to detect and difficult to trace to the byproduct.
25. More specifically, the expected cost is the cost of being held liable ($10 million) discounted by the

probability of being held liable (40%), and 0.4 * ($10,000,000) = $4,000,000.
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prosecution efforts. But increasing the probability in the civil context is more
difficult, as private actors maintain responsibility for enforcement.26 Thus, the
legal system has turned to the second option to align Chemicorp's incentives with
those of society by increasing the damages it must pay if it is held liable. Punitive
damages fulfill this role by increasing the cost of being held liable for
Chemicorp. In this example, punitive damages of $15 million would be required
to perfectly align Chemicorp's incentives with those of society. If Chemicorp is
held liable, it will pay $10 million in compensatory damages and $15 million in
punitive damages for a total of $25 million. Multiplying this total by the 40%
chance of being held liable, Chemicorp faces an expected cost of $10 million by
storing its byproducts onsite, which is exactly the cost it imposes on society by
doing so.
The economic theory of punitive damages is a generalization of the above
example. 2 7 Suppose that a defendant will be held liable with probability p and
will pay compensatory damages of CD if it is held liable. Thus, the expected cost
of liability is p * CD. Assuming that the compensatory damages capture the harm
imposed on society as a result of the defendant's actions as they should, this
defendant's incentives to avoid potentially harmful actions are not aligned with
those of society since it discounts the cost of the harm by the probability of being
held liable. To realign the defendant's incentives with those of society, a court
can impose punitive damages of PD, meaning that the defendant pays CD + PD
if it is held liable and faces an expected liability cost of p * (CD + PD).
To perfectly realign the incentives of the defendant with those of society,
the court should impose the amount of punitive damages that forces the defendant's expected liability costs to equal the costs it imposes on society, i.e.,
p * (CD + PD) = CD. Rearranging this equation, we can derive a simple formula for the amount of punitive damages required to force the defendant to internalize the full amount of the cost it imposes on society:
PD = ((1 - p)/p) * CD. In other words, the amount of punitive damages necessary to properly align the defendant's incentives is the amount of compensatory damages in the case multiplied by an amount that depends on the probability
of being held liable.2 8 Law and economics scholars have extended this simple
theory of punitive damages in numerous ways. 2 9 A full review of these detailed

&

26. See Steven R Salbu, Developing Rational Punitive Damages Policies: Beyond the Constitution, 49
FLA. L. REV. 247,276-77 (1997) (describing the role ofpunitive damages in encouraging private litigants to hold
wrongdoers accountable); see, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 511 (2008) (discussing enforcement by a private actor).
27. Our discussion of the economic theory of punitive damages closely follows that provided by SHAVELL
supra note 23, at 243-47 and Hersch & Viscusi, Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 3-4. See also Polinsky
Shavell, supra note 23, at 887-96 (offering an in-depth discussion of the theory of punitive damages).
28. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 23, at 874 ("When an injurer has a chance of escaping liability, the
proper level of total damages to impose on him, if he is found liable, is the harm caused multiplied by the recip-

rocal of the probability of being found liable.").
29.

See, e.g., Yasuhiro Ikeda & Daisuke Mori, Can Decoupling Punitive Damages Deter an Injurer's

Harmful Activity?, 11 REv. L. EcoN. 513, 513 (2015) (developing a model in which punitive damages are decoupled so that they are paid into a state-administered system instead of to plaintiffs).
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mathematical extensions is beyond the scope of this Article, but the simple equation above captures the essence of the theory.
The amount of punitive damages captured in the above equation is often
referred to as the "optimal" amount of punitive damages because it results in the
"optimal" deterrence of the defendant.30 The amount is optimal because it perfectly aligns the defendant's expected costs of liability with the costs it imposes
on society. 31 If the amount of punitive damages were smaller, then some defendants, facing liability costs that are too low, will engage in harmful conduct because they do not face the full costs of that conduct. This case of under-deterrence
is essentially what happened in the Chemicorp example. On the other hand, if
the amount of punitive damages were greater, then some defendants will fail to
engage in conduct that would benefit society.
For example, consider a power plant that-like many power plants-emits
pollution as a byproduct of producing electricity. This pollution is harmful, but
if courts impose punitive damages beyond those necessary to force the power
plant to internalize the costs of pollution (and take measures to mitigate its polluting activities accordingly), the power plant may simply decide to stop producing electricity altogether because the liability costs are too high. In this case, local
residents may find themselves facing much higher prices for electricity that must
be purchased from other, more distant, power plants. Scholars often refer to this
case of over-deterrence as a chilling effect, 3 2 as the power plant fails to engage
in socially beneficial activities because of excess liability costs.
In general, courts must engage in a delicate balancing game when awarding
the optimal amount of punitive damages to avoid under- or over-deterring defendants. This game is made more difficult by the facts that compensatory damages often do not perfectly capture the harm imposed on society for a variety of
reasons-e.g., the jury cannot effectively calibrate compensatory damages to the
harm suffered by the plaintiffs-and that the probability of being held liable is
generally unknown, difficult to estimate, and of little interest to courts (beyond
its role in ascertaining punitive damages). 33 Moreover, the role of punitive damages in punishing defendants could conflict with their role of deterring behavior,
34
making optimal deterrence more difficult to achieve. Compounding the complicated role punitive damages play in the legal system is the requirement that
defendants not only be able to ascertain the costs of their conduct and the prob35
ability of liability (as required in the economic theory of punitive damages) but

30.
31.
32.
excessive
33.

Hersch & Viscusi, Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 23, at 962 n.36 ("Obviously, any damages imposed on such a party are
and will chill participation in activities in which such mistakes occur.").
See Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as Risk Man-

ager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 902 (1998).
34. For example, a defendant may engage in particularly reprehensible conduct that society deems worthy
of harsh punishment, but the probability of liability for that conduct may be high. In that case, the punishment
rationale for punitive damages would require a greater amount of damages than the deterrence rationale. A similar
tension arises if the probability of liability is low and the conduct is not deemed worthy of punishment.
35. See infra Section H.A.
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predict how courts will determine these costs and probability. If defendants cannot effectively predict what their punitive damages will be in the event of liability, then the value of these damages in deterring defendants is diminished since
defendants will make decisions based on erroneous expectations of damages.
The difficulty of calibrating punitive damages to achieve their goals does
not undermine the theoretical conclusion that awarding punitive damages can be
optimal in many cases. It has, however, led the Supreme Court and state governments to impose certain controls that address the practical problems inherent in
awarding punitive damages. The next Section reviews the current legal framework surrounding punitive damages.
B.

Awarding Punitive Damages:Federal andState Law

Because of their unique role, the legal framework for awarding punitive
damages is quite different from that for compensatory damages. Both federal and
state law play a role in the imposition of punitive damages, but the bases of the
federal and state interventions into punitive damages awards stem from different
considerations. Federal requirements for punitive damages arise from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are primarily directed at protecting defendants from "grossly excessive" punitive damages.36 While this objective is effectively a concern about over-deterrence, state law interventions into
punitive damages awards are more explicit in their concern with over-deterrence.
Moreover, unlike the constitutional considerations that drive federal law requirements, state law interventions are generally driven by specific policy considerations. We begin by examining the constitutional framework of punitive damages
before reviewing the policy concerns and specific state interventions into these
damages.
1.

Fuzzy Math and the ConstitutionalityofPunitive Damages

The Supreme Court has evaluated the constitutionality of punitive damages
under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments,3 7 and though it has always
held that punitive damages in general remain constitutional, it has imposed several limitations on how they are awarded. Beginning with the Court's earlier forays into this area, it held in United States v. Halperthat no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment occurs when a defendant faces a

36.

Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1991).

37. The Court has also addressed questions concerning punitive damages under the Seventh Amendment.
These questions pertain, however, to issues of how federal appellate courts review punitive damages. See, e.g.,
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424,436 (2001) ("Our decisions in analogous cases,
together with the reasoning that produced those decisions, thus convince us that courts of appeals should apply a
de novo standard of review when passing on district courts' determinations of the constitutionality of punitive
damages awards."); see also, e.g., id at 437 ("Unlike the measure of actual damages suffered, which presents a
question of historical or predictive fact . .. the level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury."

(quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 459 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).
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civil award for punitive damages following criminal sanctions for the same conduct. 38 The Court later held that punitive damages do not violate the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 39 In Browning-FerrisIndustries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, the Court held that the "Excessive Fines Clause does not
apply to awards of punitive damages in cases between private parties." 40 The
Court noted that it had "never held, or even intimated, that the Eighth Amendment serves as a check on the power of a jury to award damages in a civil case."4 1
Instead, the Eighth Amendment and the protections it provides are concerned
"with criminal process and with direct actions initiated by government to inflict
punishment.'4 2 The Court explained that "[a]wards of punitive damages do not
implicate these concerns"4 3 and therefore declined to restrict the imposition of
punitive damages under the Eighth Amendment."
Having declined to bar or even impose limitations on punitive damages under the Fifth or Eighth Amendments, the Court subsequently reviewed punitive
damages awards under the Fourteenth Amendment. 45 After skirting the question
of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards under the Fourteenth Amendment in several cases, 46 the Court first addressed a challenge to punitive damages
under the Due Process Clause in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip.47 Reviewing both state and federal jurisprudence, the Court concluded that nothing
in the common law method of imposing punitive damages-i.e., allowing the
jury to decide the amount of punitive damages to award-violated due process. 48
Noting its "concern about punitive damages that 'run wild,"' however, the Court
considered whether the Due Process Clause imposes certain limits on punitive
damages, even if it does not bar their imposition altogether.49

38.

490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989), abrogated by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) ("[N]othing in

today's opinion precludes a private party from filing a civil suit seeking damages for conduct that previously was
the subject of criminal prosecution and punishment. The protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause are not triggered by litigation between private parties.").
39. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 259-60.

42.

Id. at 260.

43.

Id.

44.
45.

Id.
See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991).

46. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 276-77 (1989) (explaining that because a Fourteenth Amendment challenge was not properly before the Court, that challenge "must await another day"); see also, e.g., Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87-89 (1988) ("Appellant has touched on a due process issue
that I think is worthy of the Court's attention in an appropriate case[; however,] . .. [t]his due process question,
serious as it is, should not be decided today.").

47.
48.

499 U.S. at 15.
Id. at 17.

So far as we have been able to determine, every state and federal court that has considered the question has
ruled that the common law method for assessing punitive damages does not in itself violate due process. In
view of this consistent history, we cannot say that the common law method for assessing punitive damages
is so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
49. Id. at 18.
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Though the Court "[could] not draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit
every case" it could "say ... that general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury properly enter into
the constitutional calculus."s 0 With respect to the punitive damages award in
Haslip, the Court concluded that state law appropriately cabined the discretion
of the jury so that punitive damages were "confined to deterrence and retribution,
the state policy concerns sought to be advanced." 5 1 Reviewing the numerous factors that juries were required to consider under state law when awarding punitive
damages, 52 the Court further concluded that "[t]he application of these standards ... impose[d] a sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of... factfinders in awarding punitive damages."5 3
The Supreme Court returned to the question of the constitutionality of punitive damages under the Fourteenth Amendment in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp.5 4 The Court explained that certain awards may be so
"'grossly excessive' as to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment" and that a general concern of reasonableness underlies any inquiry
into whether a given award is grossly excessive.55 Examining the reasonableness
of the award in TXO, which was 526 times as large as the accompanying compensatory damages award, the Court refused to hold that due process requires
any particular mathematical relationship between punitive and compensatory
damages. 56 The Court explained that the award in TXO was not so unreasonable
to render it "grossly excessive" and, in doing so, endorsed the factors used by
different state courts to determine reasonableness without indicating which factors were most important among them.57
50.
51.
52.

Id
Id. at 19.
See id. at 21-22.

It was announced that the following could be taken into consideration in determining whether the award
was excessive or inadequate: (a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages
award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has
occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the
defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) the
profitability to the defendant of the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of
having the defendant also sustain a loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant; (e) all the costs of
litigation; (f) the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in
mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct, these also
to be taken in mitigation.

Id.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 22.
509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993).
Id. at 458.
Id. at 458-60.

57. Id. at 459-60 (endorsing the approaches used by the Alabama and West Virginia Supreme Courts in
determining the reasonableness of a particular punitive damages award). The Court further added that the size of
the potential harm to the plaintiff could be relevant in the reasonableness determination as well. Id. at 462.
Thus, even if the actual value of the "potential harm" to respondents is not between $5 million and $8.3
million, but is closer to $4 million, or $2 million, or even $1 million, the disparity between the punitive
award and the potential harm does not, in our view, "jar one's constitutional sensibilities."

Id. (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
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While the Court initially refused to develop a clear test for the reasonableness of punitive damages awards in its early Fourteenth Amendment cases, it
reversed this course beginning with its decision in BMW ofNorth America, Inc.
v. Gore.5 8 In providing a more concrete test for whether an award was reasonable,
the Court in Gore held that the predictability of awards and the ability of defendants to anticipate these awards underlies the constitutional protections against
"grossly excessive" punitive damages awards.59 Specifically, the Court explained that "[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that
will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State
may impose." 60 The Court instantiated these elementary notions of fairness with
respect to punitive damages through three specific "guideposts" which determine
whether a particular punitive damages award is grossly excessive: (1) the "degree
of reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct, (2) the "disparity between the
harm" caused by the defendant and the "punitive damages award," and (3) the
"difference between [the punitive damages award] and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." 61
Noting that "the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct,"6 2 the Court explained that the instant "case exhibit[ed] none of the circumstances ordinarily associated with egregiously improper conduct." 63 Similarly,
noting that "exemplary damages must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to compensatory damages," the Court recognized that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in this case was 500:1.6 Though still refusing to provide a
"mathematical formula" to "mark" the "constitutional line," the Court concluded
that the high punitive-to-compensatory ratio in this case failed to fall into the
constitutional range. 65
Following Gore, courts had a clearer picture of what constituted an unreasonable punitive damages award but still lacked clarity on what ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages represented the limits of reasonability. This would
change when the Supreme Court decided State Farm v. Campbell.66 In that case,
a Utah jury had awarded the plaintiffs $2.6 million in compensatory damages

58.

517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("[W]e believe[ ] that a review of this case would help to illuminate 'the

character of the standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive awards' of punitive damages." (internal
citations omitted)).

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at
Id at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

574-75.
574.
574-75.
580.
580, 582.

65. Id at 582.The Court also considered the third guidepost in reaching this conclusion. See id. at 583-84
("In this case the $2 million economic sanction imposed on BMW is substantially greater than the statutory fines
available in Alabama and elsewhere for similar malfeasance.").

66.

538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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and $145 million in punitive damages on claims of bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 67 The trial court reduced the compensatory
and punitive awards to $1 million and $25 million, respectively, but applying the
Supreme Court's decision in Gore, the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the $145
million punitive damages award.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the punitive damages
award in this case violated the Due Process Clause. 6 9 In doing so, it reiterated its
"concern[] over the imprecise manner in which punitive damages systems are
administered." 70 With this concern in mind, the Court applied the three Gore
guideposts. While the first and third guideposts were marginally helpful in this
case, 7 1 the second guidepost was most relevant. Though the Court "decline[d]
again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed," it held that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." 72
While this holding leaves room for interpretation and, at best, represents a
fuzzy demarcation of constitutionality, 73 this "single-digit" ratio remains the
clearest statement of the Court's approach to the constitutionality of punitive
damages awards. It is also the most relevant holding in terms of furthering the
Court's overall goal of maintaining predictability within punitive damages
awards. Defendants, who are likely better able to forecast specific economic
harms of their actions, can better predict punitive damages knowing that those
damages are limited (in most cases) to a specific multiple of a forecastable dollar
amount. This is not to suggest that the Court's approach is perfect, and it explicitly noted that other ratios may apply in certain circumstances. 74

67.
68.

Id at 414-15.
Id at 415-16.

69. Id at 418 ("Under the principles outlined in BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, this case is neither
close nor difficult. It was error to reinstate the jury's $145 million punitive damages award.").

70.

Id at 417.

71. Under the first guidepost, the Court concluded that while the conduct at issue in State Farm was reprehensible, it was not sufficiently reprehensible to support the punitive damages awarded. Id. at 419-20 ("While
we do not suggest there was error in awarding punitive damages based upon State Farm's conduct toward the
Campbells, a more modest punishment for this reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the State's legitimate
objectives, and the Utah courts should have gone no further."). The Court declined to "dwell long on [the third
Gore] guidepost" but noted that the Utah Supreme Court's "analysis [under this guidepost] was insufficient to
justify the [punitive damages] award." Id at 428.
72. Id at 425; see also id. ("When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only
equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.").
73. See id ("The precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances of
the defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.").
74. See id
Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios
greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with due process where "a particularly egregious
act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages." . . . When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of
the due process guarantee.

Id. (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)).
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In contrast to the Court's somewhat fuzzy approach, the approaches of individual states in limiting punitive damages awards has been decidedly less so.
The next Subsection details state-specific interventions into punitive damages
awards.
2.

Caps and Other State Interventions in Punitive DamagesAwards

While a number of states have enacted caps on punitive damages awards,
their approaches have not been uniform. All caps place a clear limit on punitive
damages, but caps vary in the limiting number that is specified and in the permissiveness of the exceptions to their limitations. 7 6 For example, North Carolina
has enacted a simple and clear punitive damages cap that prohibits the award of
damages in excess of "three times the amount of compensatory damages or two
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), whichever is greater,"n with only one
exception.78 On the other hand, Florida has capped punitive damages at the
greater of $500,000 or three times the accompanying compensatory damages
award unless the defendant acted in an unreasonable manner. 79 If the defendant
acted unreasonably, the cap increases to the greater of $2 million or four times
the accompanying compensatory damages award.80 Further, certain types of
claims are exempt from Florida's cap.81
In contrast to the federal limits on punitive damages, states have taken
measures beyond caps to limit punitive damages. For example, several states
have increased the burden of proof for punitive damages beyond a preponderance
of the evidence-the typical burden in civil trials. Georgia requires "clear and
convincing evidence" to support an award of punitive damages, 82 and Colorado
requires plaintiffs to "prove[] beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a
wrong" to support an award of punitive damages.83 Beyond increasing the evidentiary standard plaintiffs must satisfy when seeking punitive damages, some
states have also increased the conduct standard for defendants from negligence
to gross negligence, recklessness, or malice. 84 Finally, many states require (or

.

75. A comprehensive listing of all of the reforms enacted by states may be found in Ronen Avraham,
DatabaseofState Tort Law Reforms (5th) (Univ. Texas L., L. Econ Research Paper No. e555, 2014).
76. See, e.g., MISS. CODE § 11-1-65 (2018) (detailing a relatively complicated cap on punitive damages
that shifts based on the net worth of the defendant).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(b) (2018).
78. North Carolina allows an exception to the cap only in the case of driving while impaired. See id. § ID26 ("[The punitive damages cap] shall not apply to a claim for punitive damages for injury or harm arising from
a defendant's operation of a motor vehicle if the actions of the defendant in operating the motor vehicle would
give rise to an offense of driving while impaired..
79. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(l)(a) (2018).
80. Id. § 768.73(l)(b).
81. Id. §§ 768.735-36.
82. GA. CODEANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (2018).
83. COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (2018).
84. See e.g., GA. CODE § 51-12-5.1(b) (2018) ("Punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions
in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct,
malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of eare which would raise the presumption of conscious
indifference to consequences."); MISS. CODE. § 1 1-1-65(1)(a) (2018) ("Punitive damages may not be awarded if
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allow litigants to request) bifurcated trials such that the decision of whether to
award punitive damages (and how much to award) occur in a separate phase from
the trial determining the defendant's liability for compensatory damages.85
Collectively, these reforms, while not placing a firm limit on punitive damages, reduce the chances that plaintiffs are able to successfully establish that punitive damages are warranted in a given case or, if damages are imposed, decrease the amount of damages that are awarded. Thus, these reforms play some
role in furthering the goal of rendering punitive damages awards more predictable, consistent with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. Whether punitive damages awards are actually predictable, however, remains an open question, and the next Section discusses the robust body of empirical evidence that
has been developed on this question.
C.

Are Punitive DamagesPredictable?:The Existing Evidence

As noted by Mitchell Polinsky, there are two components of predictability
with respect to punitive damages: (1) whether punitive damages will be imposed;
and (2) if they are imposed, what amount will be awarded. 86 In early work, Theodore Eisenberg and other scholars examined both of these components, analyzing a dataset of punitive damages awards from 1991 and 1992.7 With respect to
whether an award will be imposed, they found empirical evidence "suggest[ing]
a difficulty in predicting, based on available data, in precisely which cases punitive damages will be awarded."88 With respect to the amount of damages imposed, however, the Eisenberg group concluded that punitive damages are, to
some extent, predictable. Specifically, they found that "compensatory damages
explain about 47 percent of the variance in punitive damages awards," i.e., higher
compensatory damages awards predict higher punitive damages awards and explain much of the observed variation in punitive damages. 89 Based on this, the

the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages
are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for
the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.").
85. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.13(a) (West 2018) ("Any actions involving punitive damages
shall, if requested by any defendant, be conducted in a bifurcated trial.").
In an action in which the claimant seeks an award of punitive damages, the trier of fact in a bifurcated
proceeding shall first determine whether compensatory damages are to be awarded and in what amount and
by special verdict whether each defendant's conduct was malicious, intentional, fraudulent or reckless and
whether subdivision (a)(7) applies. . . . If a jury finds that the defendant engaged in malicious, intentional,
fraudulent, or reckless conduct, then the court shall promptly commence an evidentiary hearing in which
the jury shall determine the amount of punitive damages, if any.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104(a)(2)-(3) (2018).
86. A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are PunitiveDamages Really Insignificant, Predictable,andRational?A Comment on Eisenberg et al., 26 J.L. STUD. 663, 672-73 (1997).
87. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The PredictabilityofPunitive Damages, 26 J.L. STUD. 623, 632-33 (1997)
[hereinafter Eisenberg et al., PredictabilityofPunitive Damages].
88. Id at 646; see also id. ("[T]he model confirms the expected relationships but still leaves us unable to
predict accurately precisely when punitive damages will be awarded.").

89.

Id at 650.
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scholars concluded that "[i]n one respect, therefore, punitive damages awards
levels may be . . . predictable." 90
Commenting on this research, Polinksy disagreed with the Eisenberg
group's conclusions, explaining that "their results are consistent with the possibility that in each jurisdiction and case category jury decisions to award punitive
damages are random." 91 Specifically, he noted that, while the level of compensatory damages may help explain the level of punitive damages in a given case,
the "inability to predict when ... punitive damages will be awarded ... negates"
the conclusion that punitive damages are predictable. 92 Conducting a separate
analysis, Jonathan Karpoff and John Lott found evidence consistent with Polinsky's assessment that punitive damages are not, in general, predictable. 93
Expanding on this debate, Eisenberg and other scholars conducted a new
analysis that focused specifically on how punitive damages awards differed depending on whether they were imposed by a judge or jury. 94 In general, they
found no statistically significant evidence that juries were more likely to award
punitive damages than judges,95 or that juries impose higher levels of punitive
damages than judges.96 In a subsequent analysis, however, Joni Hersch and W.
Kip Viscusi found consistent empirical evidence that "juries are significantly
more likely to award punitive damages than are judges and award higher levels
of punitive damages."9 7 Eisenberg and colleagues later added that, indeed,
"judges and juries perform similarly in some punitive damages tasks and differently in others." 98
Far from an arcane, academic debate over the merits ofjudges and juries in
the punitive damages context, this debate has played an important role in the
Supreme Court's approach to punitive damages. In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
Justice Souter discussed in detail the empirical evidence generated by the Eisenberg group and others on the predictability of punitive damages awards and how

90.

Id.

91.

Polinsky, supra note 86, at 672.

92.

Id. at 672-73.

93. Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damages
Awards, 42 J.L. ECON. 527, 543 (1999) ("This result is consistent with Polinsky's prediction: we can explain the
level of punitive damages if we know they will be awarded, but we have a difficult time explaining any of the
overall variation in awards.").
94. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL
L. REv. 743, 743 (2002) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., An EmpiricalStudy].
95. Id. at 762 ("One cannot reject the hypothesis that juries are no more likely thanjudges to award punitive
damages."). But see Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 33, at 916 (finding experimental evidence that suggests juries
are more likely to award punitive damages than judges).
96. Eisenberg et al., An EmpiricalStudy, supranote 94, at 773-74 ("None of the models support the hypothesis that judges and juries differ in the way they set levels of punitive awards or in the amount of punitive
damages awarded per unit of compensatory damages.").
97. Hersch & Viscusi, Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 1.
98. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and PunitiveDamages: EmpiricalAnalyses Using the Civil
Justice Survey ofState Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL L. STuD. 263, 263-64 (2006) [hereinafter Eisenberg et al., EmpiricalAnalyses].
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this differed across judges and juries. 99 The Court then explicitly relied on these,
and other empirical results, in holding that the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages could not exceed 1:1 in maritime cases.100 Though the Court was clear
that its responsibilities in deciding the appropriate ratio of punitive to compensatory damages under federal maritime law were different from its responsibilities in determining the outer contours of permissibility under the Due Process
Clause,'o the Court's heavy (in fact, nearly exclusive) reliance on empirical results in Exxon Shipping illustrates the importance of empirical evidence in determining the appropriate restrictions on punitive damages.
While the Court was analyzing empirical results in Exxon Shipping, scholars were busy analyzing the effect of the Court's decisions on their results. 102
Unsurprisingly, the Court's decision in State Farm has been thoroughly examined in multiple studies, given its prominence in placing the clearest constitutional limitation to date on punitive damages.1 03 Returning to the Court's primary
concern regarding the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages-i.e., the ratio that has dominated the Supreme Court's cases over the past
fifteen years-separate studies by McMichael along with Eisenberg and Heise
concluded that this decision did little to reduce punitive damages awards as one
might expect.'" Instead, the evidence based on a national sample of state court
cases suggested that State Farm either had no effect on punitive damages awards
or actually increased those awards. 0 5
Examining the same dataset of punitive damages awards, McMichael and
Viscusi applied a specific mathematical model of how adjudicators impose punitive damages, accounting separately for the decision to impose any damages
99. 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008) ("A recent comprehensive study of punitive damages awarded by juries in
state civil trials found a median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards ofjust 0.62:1, but a mean ratio of 2.90:1
and a standard deviation of 13.81." (citing Eisenberg et al., EmpiricalAnalyses, supra note 98, at 269)).
100. Id.at513.
On these assumptions, a median ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of about 0.65:1 probably marks
the line near which cases like this one largely should be grouped. Accordingly, given the need to protect
against the possibility (and the disruptive cost to the legal system) of awards that are unpredictable and
unnecessary, either for deterrence or for measured retribution, we consider that a 1:1 ratio, which is above
the median award, is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases.
Id. (citing Eisenberg et al., EmpiricalAnalyses, supra note 98, at 269).

101.

Id. 501-02.

Today's enquiry differs from due process review because the case arises under federal maritime jurisdiction,
and we are reviewing ajury award for conformity with maritime law, rather than the outer limit allowed by
due process; we are examining the verdict in the exercise of federal maritime common law authority, which
precedes and should obviate any application of the constitutional standard. Our due process cases, on the
contrary, have all involved awards subject in the first instance to state law.
Id.
102. See, e.g., Viscusi & McMichael, Shifling the Fat-TailedDistribution,supra note 3, at 363-64 (examining the role of Exxon Shipping in an empirical analysis).
103. While Exxon Shipping has not been ignored, it has played a smaller role in empirical analyses because
it was limited to federal maritime cases. See, e.g., id. at 363-64 (examining the role of Exxon Shipping in an
empirical analysis); Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 3 (examining the same).
104. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 14, at 346-51; Benjamin J. McMichael, Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on Punitive Damages: Ambiguous Effects andInconsistent Justifications, 66 VAND. L. REv. 961, 993-96

(2013).
105.

Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 14, at 346-51; McMichael, supra note 104, at 993-96.
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and the decision of what amount to impose.10 6 Within this model, they found,
consistent with prior work, little evidence that State Farm limited the size of
punitive damages awards. 0 7 Unlike previous work, however, they extended their
analysis to explicitly examine the role of state punitive damages reforms alongside State Farm, finding that caps on punitive damages do not affect whether
adjudicators impose these awards but do reduce the amount of damages they impose.' 08 Further, their results suggested that increasing the conduct standard required to support a punitive damages award above negligence decreased both the
probability that punitive damages were awarded and the size of those awards.
Other state-level reforms, however, such as increasing the evidentiary burden
required to support a punitive award and allowing or requiring bifurcated trials,
affected neither the likelihood of an award, nor the size of awards.1 09
While the effect of state-level punitive-damages reforms has received attention in the literature beyond the analysis conducted by McMichael and Viscusi, the majority of the existing research has focused on the role of these reforms
on outcomes other than actual punitive damages awards.' 10 And while these analyses can elucidate the roles of changes in both state and federal law on punitive
damages generally-all of these studies consider a national sample of punitive
awards or other sample of "typical" awards-they do not focus specifically on
the types of awards that have generated the most interest among both defendants
and the Supreme Court, i.e., the very largest "outlier" awards."' These awards
are discussed in the next Part.
III.

THE BLOCKBUSTER AWARDS

Though the Supreme Court has never specifically defined what it means by
"outlier" awards, "blockbuster" awards are likely what the Court has in mind.1 12
These are awards of over $100 million at the time they are imposed and represent
a significant punishment for any defendants finding themselves liable for these

106.

McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 85-89.

107.
108.
109.

Id. at 93.
Id.
Id.

110. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham, An Empirical Study ofthe Impact ofTort Reforms on Medical Malpractice
Settlement Payments, 34 J.L. STuD. S183 (2007) (considering the role of punitive damages caps in medical malpractice payments); Ronen Avraham & Max Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform on Private Health Insurance Coverage, 12 AM. L. ECON. REv. 319 (2010) (analyzing the effect of punitive damages caps on the likelihood that individuals have health insurance); Paul Rubin & Joanna Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental
Deaths, 50 J.L. ECON. 221 (2007) (examining the effect of increased evidentiary standards for punitive damages
on accident rates).

111.

See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 (2008) ("The Court's response to outlier

punitive-damages awards has thus far been confined by claims at the constitutional level, and our cases have
announced due process standards that every award must pass."); id. at 504 ("This is why our better judgment is
that eliminating unpredictable outlying punitive awards by more rigorous standards than the constitutional limit
will probably have to take the form adopted in those States that have looked to the criminal-law pattern of quan-

tified limits.").
112. The Court has also referred to outlier awards in terms of a very high ratio between punitive and compensatory damages. See id. at 501.

190

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2019

awards.1 3 Though such large awards are not common-only 137 were imposed
between 1981 and 2013114-they have the potential to catch the attention of even
large corporate defendants and are often imposed as a strong condemnation of a
defendant's behavior. For example, the first blockbuster award was imposed in
Grimshaw v. FordMotor Co. based on Ford's design of the Pinto and that vehicle's proclivity to catch fire following rear-end collisions." 5 Even decades after
the award was handed down by a California jury, the case is interpreted as a
warning to the automobile industry that consumers would not tolerate manufacturers ignoring defects and that, if they did, they would be punished accordingly." 6

113. See Viscusi & McMichael, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distribution, supra note 3, at 350 (referring to
scholars considering awards of more than $100 million "blockbuster" awards).
114. Seeidat357.

115.

119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 771-79 (1981).

116. Carol J. Williams, Toyota Is Just the Latest Automaker to Face Auto Safety Litigation, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 14, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/14/business/la-fi-toyota-litigatel4-2010narl4 (noting that
the award "signaled to the auto industry that it would be harshly sanctioned for ignoring known defects").

.........
I1 I
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FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF BLOCKBUSTER AWARDS BY YEAR
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Notes: The jagged, horizontal line represents the total number of blockbuster awards handed
down each year, and the vertical line indicates when State Farm was decided.

Following Grimshaw, blockbuster awards became increasingly common in
the ensuing decades, and by the early 1990s, five or more blockbuster awards per
year was the norm. Figure 1 provides an overview of the number of blockbuster
cases each year. Picking up steam in the 1990s, the total number of blockbuster
cases peaked in 1999 with fifteen awards. Thereafter, the number per year decreased, and following the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm-delineated
in Figure 1 with the vertical line at the 2003 mark-no more than eight blockbuster awards have been handed down in any single year. While blockbuster punitive damages awards have been mainstays of the legal world since the 1990s,
not all states can lay claim to having such an award. Indeed, a few states have
dominated the blockbuster landscape, and Figure 2 provides a heat map of states
where blockbuster awards have been imposed, with darker states having had
more such awards. Unsurprisingly, populous states like Texas and California
have had the most blockbuster awards. Interestingly, however, smaller states

such as West Virginia, Alabama, and Oregon have had several awards within
their borders.
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FIGURL 2: HEAT IMAP OF BL OCKBUST:R AWARDS

uter cases are included. Darker states have ha

fable 1 provides an exhaustive listing of all of the blockbuster cases we
have identified between 1981 and 2013, which is the time period that will be
used for the subsequent empirical analysis. Included with each case is the amount
of compensatory damages ("CD"') and punitive damages ("PD") awarded (in millions of dollars) and the ratio between the two. Many awards barely satisfy the
blockbuster criterion of $100 million, which may be a focal damage amount for
jurors, but a number of awards exceed this threshold by more than an order of
magnitude. The ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, which has recei'ved
most of the C'ourt's attention, varies widely from well under I to over 10,000 in
the most extreme cases. Collectively, F igures 1 and 2 along with T1able 1 paint
an interesting picture of the blockbuster landscape, and these awards have been
the subject of some debate, particularly given that they are among the most extreme outlying cases that have cauight the eye of the Supreme Court.
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TABLE 1: BLOCKBUSTER CASES
Case Name
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co.
Micro/Vest v. ComputerLand

State

Year

Punitive

Compensatory

Ratio

CA

1981

125

3

40.64

CA

1985

125

400

0.31

Pennzoil v. Texaco
In re Tech. Equities Fed.
Sec. Litig.
Md. Deposit Ins. Fund v.
Seidel

TX

1985

3,000

7,530

0.40

CA

1988

147

7

21.00

MD

1988

322

65

4.95

Coyne v. Celotex
Proctor v. Davis and Upjohn
Co.
Dominguez Energy v. Shell
Oil
Amoco v. Lloyd's of London

MD

1989

150

2

75.00

IIL

1991

125

3

39.55

CA

1993

173

47

3.69

CA

1993

386

36

10.73

Moseley v. Gen. Motors

GA

1993

101

4

23.82

Hedrick v. Sentry Ins. Co.
Rubicon Petroleum Inc. v.
Amoco
Howell v. Blockbuster
Entm't Corp.

TX

1993

100

2

46.08

TX

1993

250

125

2.00

TX

1994

109

15

7.41

In re The Exxon Valdez

AK

1995

5,000

287

17.42

Perez v. William Recht Co.

FL

1995

300

200

1.50

1

334.44

Smith v. Delta TV

MS

1995

167

O'Keefe v. Loewen Grp.

MS

1995

400

100

4.00

Hardy v. Gen. Motors Corp.
Forti v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp.
Houchens v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp.
Barnett v. La Societe
Anonyme Turbomeca
France
Broussard v. Meineke Disc.
Muffler Shops
Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v.
KCS Res.
Bartlett v. Mitchell Energy
Corp.
Campbell v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
In re New Orleans Tank Car
Leakage Fire Litig.

AL

1996

100

50

2.00

CA

1996

100

7

13.51

KY

1996

210

8

27.27

MZ

1996

175

175

1.00

NC

1996

150

197

0.76

TX

1996

114

29

3.93

TX

1996

200

4

49.38

UT

1996

145

3

55.77

LA

1997

3,365

2

1682.50

SC

1997

250

13

20.00

TX

1997

138

13

10.70

MMAR. v. Dow Jones

TX

1997

200

23

8.81

Lockheed Litigation Cases

CA

1998

760

25

29.92

Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp.
50-Off Stores Inc. v. Banque
Paribas (Suisse)
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Six Flags Over Ga. v.
Time Warner

GA

1998

257

197

1.30
4.82

Robinson v. Ford Motor Co.

MS

1998

120

25

Aaron v. Abex Corp.
Carlisle v. Whirlpool Fin.
Nat'l Bank

TX

1998

100

16

6.41

AL

1999

580

1

591.84

Aultman v. Duncan Mfg.
Robert J. Bellott Ins.
Agency Inc. v. State Farm
Mut.

AL

1999

100

15

6.90

AK

1999

150

3

55.56

Romo v. Ford Motor Co.

CA

1999

290

5

54.72

CA

1999

4,775

108

44.38

CA

1999

116

5

25.78

8

16.88

Anderson v. Gen. Motors
Goodrich v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare of Cal.
Trovan Ltd. v. Pfizer Inc.

CA

1999

135

Martin v. ServiceMaster Co.

GA

1999

135

1

107.14

Avery v. State Farm
Alcorn v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.

IL

1999

600

130

4.62

MO

1999

120

40

2.97

White v. Ford Motor Co.

NV

1999

153

2

66.60

Swan v. Einhorn

PA

1999

752

155

4.85

Rhodes v. Sensitive Care
City of West Allis v. Wis.
Elec.
Cowart v. Johnson Kart
Mfg.

TX

1999

250

<1

1250.00

WI

1999

100

5

22.22

WI

1999

1,000

24

41.67

Carroll v. Interstate Brands
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Dorman v. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc.
Pioneer Commercial Funding v. Am. Fin. Mortg.
Timely Adventures v.
Coastal Mart Inc.
Martin v. Children's Advanced Med. Insts.

CA

2000

121

11

11.00

FL

2000

145,000

13

MO

2000

100

5

20.00

PA

2000

338

15

23.28

TX

2000

100

2

47.62

TX

2000

137

132

1.04
541.52

11417.32

Boeken v. Philip Morris
Elahi v. Islamic Republic of
Iran

CA

2001

3,000

6

DC

2001

300

12

25.00

Cassoutt v. Cessna Aircraft
Grefer v. Alpha Tech.
Servs.
COC Servs. Ltd. v. CornpUSA
Fuqua v. Horizon/CMS
Healthcare Corp.

FL

2001

400

80

5.00

LA

2001

1,000

56

17.82

TX

2001

365

90

4.05

TX

2001

310

3

114.39

Bell v. Dresser Indus.

TX

2001

100

30

3.33

Jernigan v. Gen. Motors

AL

2002

100

22

4.55

Bullock v. Philip Morris

CA

2002

28,000

1

43076.92

Claghorn v. Edsaco

CA

2002

165

6

28.95
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City of Hope v. Genentech
Steele Software Corp. v.
First Union Nat'l Bank
IGEN Int'l Inc. v.
Roche Diagnostics GmbH
Hayes v. Courtney Pharmacy, Inc.
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CA

2002

200

300

0.67

MD

2002

200

76

2.63

MD

2002

400

105

3.81

MO

2002

2,000

225

8.89

Schwarz v. Philip Morris
Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Ala. Dep't of Conservation
& Nat. Res.
Beckman Coulter Inc. v.
Flextronics

OR

2002

150

<1

882.35

AL

2003

11,800

64

185.53

CA

2003

931

3

321.03

Price v. Philip Morris, Inc.

IL

2003

3,100

7,100

0.44

Whittington v. U.S. Steel
Motorola Credit Corp. v.
Uzan
TVT Records v. Island Def
Jam Music Grp.

IL

2003

200

50

4.00

NY

2003

2,130

2,130

1.00

NY

2003

107

25

4.28

OH

2003

250

12

20.33

TX

2003

100

40

2.50

AL

2004

1,600

20

80.00

Bums v. Prudential Sec.
Anadarko Petroleum Corp.
v. T-Bar X Ltd. Co.
Whittaker v. Sw. Life Ins.
Co.
Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor
Co.

CA

2004

246

123

2.00

Brown v. Dorsey
Medtronic Sofamor Danek
Inc. v. Michelson

GA

2004

450

326

1.38

TN

2004

400

160

2.50

Poliner v. Tex. Health Sys.

TX

2004

110

256

0.43

Coffey v. Wyeth
Garamendi v. Altus Fin.,
S.A.

TX

2004

900

113

7.94

CA

2005

700

0

N/A

Savaglio v. Wal-Mart Stores
Coleman Parent Holdings v.
Morgan Stanley

CA

2005

115

57

2.02

FL

2005

850

604

1.41

Ernst v. Merck

TX

2005

229

25

9.35

Featherston v. Gressler

TX

2005

600

6

100.00

City of Modesto v. Dow

CA

2006

175

3

54.69

de Villers v. Rossum
Cook v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp.

CA

2006

100

6

16.67

CO

2006

200

354

0.57

Navarro v. Austin
Man Aktiengesellschaft v.
Freightliner LLC
Gulsby Eng'g v. Gulf
Liquids New River Project

FL

2006

100

117

0.86

OR

2006

350

966

0.36

Casas v. Paradez
Cal X-tra v. Phoenix Holdings II LLC

TX

2006

325

375

0.87

TX

2006

150

10

15.00

AZ

2007

150

210

0.71
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Banco Espirito Santo International Ltd. v. BDO Seidman LLP

FL

2007

352

170

2.07

FL

2007

100

10

10.00

WV

2007

100

120

0.83

WV

2007

196

56

3.54

WV

2007

270

134

2.01

AL

2008

175

40

4.38

CA

2008

236

371

0.64

FL

2008

100

25

3.98

FL

2008

250

3

100.00

NV

2008

250

138

1.81

Estate of Mack v. Mack
Adidas Am. Inc. v. Payless
Shoesource, Inc.

NV

2008

405

185

2.19

OR

2008

137

168

0.82

Stone v. Marcone
Naugle v. Philip Morris
USA, Inc.
Ind. Recovery Capital Holdings, Inc. v. Simmons
Newman v. Nat'l W. Life
Ins. Co.

FL

2009

275

55

5.00

FL

2009

244

56

4.36

TX

2009

145

34

4.30

TX

2009

150

<1

1330.54

Garner v. BP Prods. N. Am.
Evans v. A.W. Chesterton
Co.

TX

2009

100

<1

306.51

CA

2010

200

9

22.67

Jackson v. Briar Hill
Chanin v. Teva Parenteral
Meds.

FL

2010

100

14

7.14

NV

2010

144

361

0.40

Velez v. Novartis Corp.
Dillard's Inc. v. i2 Tech.,
Inc.

NY

2010

250

3

74.24

TX

2010

150

76

1.97

Middleton v. Collins
Pacesetter, Inc. v. Nervicon
Co.
Allison v. ExxonMobil
Corp.

TX

2011

150,000

370

405.41

CA

2011

500

1,816

0.28

MD

2011

1,045

497

2.10

Heilig v. Fluor Corp.
Brown v. Chevron Phillips
Chemical Co.

MO

2011

320

39

8.31

MS

2011

300

22

13.64

Ray v. Allergan, Inc.

VA

2011

200

12

16.67

Sacks v. Sicor Inc.

NV

2011

163

20

8.08

Meins v. Bayer AG

AR

2011

125

17

7.40

Martin v. Swain
Wheeling Pittsburgh v. Massey Energy Co.
Perrine v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours and Co.
Estate of Tawney v. Colum.
Nat. Res.
State of Alabama v.
AstraZeneca LP
ICO Global Communications v. Boeing Satellite Sys.
Int'l Inc.
Estate of LoCascio v.
LoCascio
Estate of del Pino v. The Republic of Cuba
Hyatt v. Franchise Tax Bd.
of the State of Cal.
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Webb v. Trans Healthcare,
Inc.
Garcia v. Apollo Beach
Food Mart, Inc.
Nunziata v. Pinellas Park
Nursing Home
Chopourian v. Catholic
Healthcare W.

197

FL

2012

700

200

3.50

FL

2012

550

167

3.30

FL

2012

140

60

2.33

CA

2012

140

0

N/A

Juno v. Amare

AL

2012

125

43

2.93

Mansfield v. Homer
Townsend v.
Trans Healthcare, Inc.
Lennar Corp. v.
Briarwood Capital
Meyer v. Health Plan of
Nev., Inc.
Aguilar v. Heckmann
Water Res., Inc.
Carduco Inc. v. Mercedes
Benz USA

MO

2012

100

9

11.49

FL

2013

1,000

110

9.09

FL

2013

200

802

0.25

NV

2013

500

24

20.83

TX

2013

100

182

0.55

TX

2013

115

27

4.19

After blockbuster awards were first classified as a subset of punitive damages awards in 2004,117 Alison Del Rossi and W. Kip Viscusi performed a rigorous empirical analysis of these extreme awards, focusing specifically on how the
pattern of blockbuster awards changed following landmark decisions. They
found consistent evidence that State Farm reduced the size of blockbuster
awards, the number of blockbuster awards, and the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages."1 8 In a subsequent analysis, Viscusi and McMichael
compared blockbuster punitive damages awards to other statistical outliers that
are observed for natural disasters, such as hurricanes and earthquakes, because
both blockbuster awards and natural disasters have what statisticians call "fat
tailed distributions."'11 9 In particular, the extremely high loss disasters are at a
level that would not be predicted if losses were normally distributed. The fact
that the distribution of blockbuster awards has a fat tail means that they "occur
more often and are more difficult to predict than if blockbuster awards were distributed normally." 20 Viscusi and McMichael found consistent evidence, however, that State Farm rendered blockbuster awards more predictable by decreasing the amount of punitive damages awarded in blockbuster cases, reducing the
likelihood that cases included punitive awards in excess of the "single-digit ratio" discussed by the Supreme Court, and "effectively 'thin[ning]' the fat tail of
the distribution of blockbuster awards."l 21
While the blockbuster awards have been subject to empirical analyses, one
key aspect of these awards has gone unexamined-the role of state-level punitive

117.
118.

See Hersch & Viscusi, PunitiveDamages, supra note 3, at 2; Viscusi, supra note 3, at 1405.
Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 3, at 137-52.

119.

Viscusi & McMichael, Shifting the Fat-TailedDistribution,supranote 3, at 350.

120.
121.

Id.
Id at 360-70, 376.
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damages reforms. To be sure, understanding the effect of State Farm on these
outlier awards is important; however, the Supreme Court has been clear that it is
willing to look to state-level reforms, such as caps on punitive damages, when
122
Thus, underdetermining the appropriate restrictions on punitive damages.
elucidate
can
awards
blockbuster
on
reforms
state
these
of
effect
the
standing
large
to
extremely
challenges
future
address
may
the
Court
in
which
new ways
empirical
first
the
offers
Part
next
the
Accordingly,
awards.
damages
punitive
analysis that specifically examines state-level reforms and compares them to existing restrictions under federal law.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
When awarding punitive damages, adjudicators face two separate-though
related-decisions. First, they must decide, based on the reprehensibility of the
defendants' conduct, whether these damages are warranted in a given case.123
Second, they must decide what amount of punitive damages are appropriate to
deter and punish the defendant.1 2 4 In the context of blockbuster awards, these
two decisions translate neatly into two separate empirical analyses, and we present both in this Part. We begin by examining the frequency of blockbuster
awards and whether the number of awards per year has been affected by State
Farm, state level reforms, both, or neither. While we cannot directly examine the
probability that a particular case involves a blockbuster punitive damages
award,1 25 examining the frequency of awards can elucidate whether State Farm
and state-level reforms effectively reduce this probability. In the second phase of
our analysis, we focus on the amount of damages awarded in blockbuster cases.
Before delving into the details of our analytical approach, however, we first provide an overview of the data on blockbuster awards we examine.
A.

Data

Much of the data used in our analysis is reported in Table 1, which includes
the year and state of each blockbuster award we have identified as well as the
126
In addition to these
amount of compensatory damages and punitive damages.
details, we collected information on the industry of the defendant and categorized
defendants into the following industry groups: automobile, tobacco, finance and
insurance, petroleum and chemical, and health care. Not all defendants fit into
122.
123.

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,495-96 (2008).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,409 (2003).

124. Polinsky, supra note 86, at 672.
125. To do so, we would have to either observe every single civil case that is eligible for punitive damages
across the United States-obviously beyond our capabilities-or a subset of cases that have the potential to involve a blockbuster award. Even if we could observe all of the cases necessary to develop this subset, any attempt
to systematically identify these cases would almost certainly introduce bias into our analysis. Accordingly, we
restrict our analysis to the frequency of blockbuster awards because a decrease (increase) in the frequency of
these awards necessarily implies a decrease (increase) in the probability that they are imposed.
126. While Table 1 reports the actual amount of damages awarded in a given case, for the purposes of our
empirical analysis, all damages amounts are inflated to 2013 dollars.
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these categories, and we classify defendants who participate in all other industries into a separate category. For each of these industry categories, we create an
indicator variable that equals one if a particular case involved a defendant from
that industry. Individual industries may have different norms, different types of
damages, and different potentials to facilitate reprehensible behavior, so we include these industry indicator variables in our analysis to control for these differences.
Not all blockbuster cases involve corporate defendants, so we also created
a separate indicator variable that equals one if a given case involves both individual and corporate litigants. Adjudicators may have different attitudes with respect to imposing extremely large punitive damages awards on corporations as
opposed to individuals and including an indicator variable for the types of litigants involved addresses the concern that these different attitudes may bias our
results. Among cases not involving corporate litigants, some involve violent
crimes, and we created an indicator variable for these cases. 127 Violent crimes
may be particularly well suited to blockbuster punitive damages awards because
they almost certainly involve particularly reprehensible conduct. Because adjudicators may react differently to these types of cases relative to other types, we
created a separate variable for whether a violent crime was the basis of a blockbuster award.
Next, we collected information on whether a judge or jury handed down
each blockbuster award. As discussed above, a significant amount of scholarly
attention has been focused on the differences between judges and juries with respect to punitive damages awards. 128 Therefore, we use an indicator variable for
whether a judge imposed a given award throughout our analysis. Including this
variable ensures that our results are not biased because judges and juries approach punitive damages differently. Finally, while creating a variable for
whether a given case is subject to the limitations outlined in State Farm is
straightforward, 129 creating indicator variables for state-level reforms is less so.
As discussed above, punitive damages caps take various forms, and no two states
have enacted exactly the same cap.' 30 Including separate indicator variables for
each cap is not statistically feasible,1 31 so we rely on the Database of State Tort
Law Reforms ("DSTLR") compiled by Ronen Avraham.1 3 2 The DSTLR provides the year of enactment and statutory text for individual punitive damages
caps, and we use this information to construct an indicator variable that equals

127. This indicator is created based on the nature of the conduct alleged and does not depend on whether
the civil defendant was indicted, prosecuted, or convicted.
128. See discussionsupra Section I.C.
129. Specifically, we created an indicator variable that equals one ifan award was imposed after State Farm
was decided.
130. See discussionsupra Subsection II.B.2.
131. Such an approach is not possible without substantial quantities of data-more than are available to
researchers. Additionally, including a separate variable for each state's cap would simply devolve into a qualitative analysis of individual state laws. While such an analysis could be useful, that is not our goal here.
132. See generally Avraham, supra note 75.
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one when a given state had a cap in place.1 33 We also glean from the DSTLR
which states had enacted evidentiary reform with respect to punitive damages for
use in supplemental analyses.
Using all of these data, we conduct a thorough empirical analysis of the
effects of both State Farm and state-level reforms on blockbuster awards. The
next Section describes that analysis in detail.
B.
1.

Analysis andResults

Award Frequency

Beginning with the frequency with which blockbuster awards are imposed,
we estimate a series of empirical models to examine the impact of State Farm
and state-level reforms, particularly punitive damages caps. Specifically, we estimate four ordinary least squares ("OLS") regression models, and throughout
this phase of our analysis, the dependent variable is a count of the number of
blockbuster cases that were decided in each state in each year. The independent
variables of interest in these regressions are indicators for whether a state had
enacted a punitive damages cap and an indicator for whether State Farm had
been decided. In theory, the effect of both of these variables should be negative,
implying that punitive damages caps and State Farm both reduced the frequency
of blockbuster awards.1 34 More interesting than the individual effects of these
legal changes, however, are their comparative effects.
Ex ante, there are good reasons to believe that State Farm may have a
stronger effect than punitive damages caps. As Supreme Court precedent, it applies more broadly than punitive damages caps, and relative to caps, the singledigit-ratio limitation contains fewer exceptions.' 35 There are also good reasons
to believe, however, that caps may have a stronger dampening effect on the frequency of blockbuster punitive damages awards than State Farm. Caps generally
place stricter limits on punitive damages awards."' Because one might hypothesize that either State Farm or punitive damages caps may have a stronger effect
on the number of blockbuster awards, comparing the magnitude of their effects
within our empirical analysis can elucidate which legal change has been more
salient.

133. The DSTLR further providers a "clever" definition of punitive damages caps. "Clever" caps include
only those that are set low enough and contain sufficiently few exceptions to effectively bind courts when imposing punitive damages awards. Throughout our analysis, we use the DSTLR's definition of a clever cap. See
id.
134. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); see also McMichael
& Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 91.
135. The Court has never outlined what these exceptions may be but has implied that, in at least some cases,
violating the single-digit ratio is constitutionally permissible. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (holding that "few"
awards in excess of a single-digit ratio will satisfy due process without specifying what factors may allow an
award to exceed this ratio while still satisfying due process).
136. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (2018) (allowing a ratio not to exceed 1:1, except for a limited
set of circumstances in which 3:1 in permissible).
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In addition to the independent variables of interest, we include a linear time
trend to account for the general growth in the number of blockbuster awards over
time. Our analysis also includes indicator variables for each state, which control
for any idiosyncratic factors unique to specific states that may affect the frequency of blockbuster awards. Throughout our analysis, we calculate heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
In the interest of succinctness, the implications of our primary regression
results are reported in Figure 3.137 We estimate four separate regression models,
and each bar or set of bars in Figure 3 represents the primary results from a single
model. All four models include all of the control variables discussed above but
successively add different variables for the effect of State Farm and punitive
damages caps.1 3 8 Model 1, which focuses only on the effect of State Farm, provides strong evidence that State Farm has a limiting effect on the number of
blockbuster awards. State Farm reduced the number of blockbuster awards by
about 0.1. Model 2, which focuses on the effect of punitive damages caps, provides strong evidence that, like State Farm, caps reduce the number of blockbuster awards. The effect of caps, however, is smaller than the effect of State
Farm, suggesting that the latter may be slightly more effective at reducing the
incidence of blockbuster awards.

137. Complete regression results are provided in the Technical Appendix.
138. Estimating multiple models and successively adding the variables of interest ensures that these variables have a consistent effect across models and acts as a robustness check on the results.
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EFFECT OF STATE FARMAND PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAPS ON
AWARD FREQUENCY
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Notes: N = 957. Each bar or set of bars in Figure 3 represents the primary results from a single model, and the model
numbers correspond to the models reported in Table Al in the Technical Appendix.

Model 3 and Model 4 include both the State Farm and cap variables so that
both effects are taken into account. 139 Model 4 also includes indicator variables
for other pertinent tort reforms; in particular, punitive damages, evidentiary re-

form, and trial bifurcation. Across both Model 3 and Model 4, the effects of State
Farm and punitive damages caps remain stable and statistically significant. In
Model 3, State Farm has a -0.1460 effect on the number of blockbuster cases,
compared to -0.0997 for state caps. Though not reported in Figure 3, allowing or
requiring bifurcated trials does not have a statistically significant effect on the
number of blockbuster awards. 14 Maintaining a lower evidentiary standard (i.e.,
not increasing this standard to a "clear and convincing" or "reasonable doubt"
standard), however, increases the number of blockbuster awards by about the
same amount as State Farm reduces this number.

Overall, we find consistent evidence that both State Farm and punitive
damages caps reduce the number of blockbuster awards. In all of our models,
however, State Farm has a somewhat greater effect on the number of cases than

do punitive caps. We explore the implications of State Farm having a larger effect than caps below. But before doing so, we first discuss the effect of State

139. Including both variables in the same regression ensures that one variable is not simply picking up the
effect of the other.
140. See McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 93-94.
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Farm and caps on the amount of damages awarded because this further elucidates
the comparative effects of these two legal changes.
2.

AwardAmounts

In examining the amount of damages awarded as part of blockbuster cases,
we estimate a series of OLS regression models to determine the impact of statelevel reforms and State Farm on the magnitude of these awards. In all of these
models, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the amount of punitive
damages awarded. 14 1 Importantly, all of the models examining the amount of
punitive damages awarded include, as an independent variable, the natural logarithm of compensatory damages. 14 2 We include this variable in all of our models
because prior work has consistently demonstrated a strong association between
the amount of compensatory damages awarded and the amount of punitive damages. 143 Further, the Supreme Court has stated its strong interest in the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages, 1" and including a compensatory damages variable allows us to examine this relationship in detail.
As with the models focusing on the number of blockbuster cases, we sequentially add the State Farm and punitive damages cap variables to examine
their effect on the amount of punitive damages awarded. In addition to including
these variables alone, we also estimate models which include an interaction between these variables and the natural logarithm of compensatory damages. The
models which include only the indicator variables allow us to examine the general effect of State Farm and punitive damages caps, and the models which include the interaction of these variables and compensatory damages allow us to
examine how State Farm and punitive damages caps mediate the relationship
between compensatory and punitive damages.
As discussed above, all of our models include a series of control variables,
which allow us to isolate the effect of the variables of interest from other factors
that may impact the amount of punitive damages awarded. In particular, we include a series of indicator variables for the different industries mentioned above
and an indicator variable for whether the case involved a violent crime. We also
include indicator variables for whether a case was decided in Texas or California,
since these states impose more blockbuster cases than any other.1 45 All of our
models include a linear time trend to capture the general increase in award

141. The amount of punitive damages awarded exhibits a substantial right skew. To address this, we follow
the standard practice in the punitive damages literature by transforming the amount of damages awarded using a
natural logarithm. Eisenberg et al., Predictability ofPunitive Damages, supra note 87, at 264; Viscusi & McMichael, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distribution, supra note 3, at 360.
142. We use the natural logarithm of this variable for the same reasons we examine the natural logarithm
of punitive damages.
143. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 14, at 344; Hersch & Viscusi, Punitive Damages, supra note 3, at 15.

144.

BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996).

145.

See supra Figure 2.
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amounts over time. Each model also includes a bench trial indicator variable, and
an indicator for whether both business and individual litigants were involved. 14 6
Figures 4 and 5 summarize the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages and the effect of State Farm and punitive damages caps on this
relationship. In both figures, a larger compensatory damages award is clearly
associated with a larger punitive damages award, as the line capturing the relationship between the types of damages has a clear upward slope.
FIGURE 4: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
BEFORE AND AFTER STATE FARM

000

10

.

C3

15
20
log(compensatory damages)
Pre-State Farm

----

25

Post-State Farm

Notes: N= 133. The pre-StateFarm line represents the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages prior
to the State Farm decision and is plotted using only pre-State Farm cases. Similarly, the post-State Farm line represents
the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages after the State Farm decision and is plotted using only
post-State Farm cases. Additional results may be found in Table A2 in the Technical Appendix.

In Figure 4, State Farm has a clear impact on the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages, as it tilts this relationship downward for large
compensatory damages amounts.14 7 At low levels of compensatory damages,
awards before and after State Farm had roughly the same relationship between

146. As discussed in more detail in the Technical Appendix, we do not separately report the results from
models that include variables for punitive damages, evidentiary reform, or bifurcated trials. These variables are
never individually statistically significant, and including them in the models does not meaningfully affect the
State Farm or punitive damages cap variables.
147. The two lines plotted in Figure 4 are based on two separate regressions (each of which includes a full
set of control variables). The "Pre-State Farm" regression model includes only those awards imposed prior to
State Farm, and the "Post-State Farm" regression model includes only those awards imposed after State Farm
was decided.
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compensatory and punitive damages; at higher levels of compensatory damages,
however, cases subject to the limitations of State Farm have a lower ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages. In other words, at lower levels of compensatory damages, an additional dollar of compensatory damages was worth about
the same in terms of increased punitive damages before and after State Farm. At
higher levels of compensatory damages, however, an additional dollar of these
damages was worth much more in terms of punitive damages before State Farm
was decided. Thus, State Farm changed the relationship between compensatory
and punitive damages in blockbuster cases just as the Supreme Court intended.
Figure 5, which presents the effect of punitive damages caps, tells a much
different story. 148 Indeed, the relationship between compensatory and punitive
damages in states with a cap is virtually indistinguishable from the relationship
in states without a cap. Thus, we find no evidence that punitive damages caps
have had a restraining effect on the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages.

148. The two lines plotted in Figure 5 are based on two separate regressions (each of which includes a full
set of control variables). The "No PD Cap" regression model includes only those awards imposed in states without a punitive damages cap, and the "PD Cap" regression model includes only those awards imposed in states
with a cap.
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FIGURE 5: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN STATES WITH AN) WITHOUT PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAPS
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Notes: N - 133. The No PD Cap line represents the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages prior in
states without a punitive damages cap and is plotted using only blockbuster cases decided in states without a cap. Simni-

larly, the PD Cap line represents the relationship between compensatory and punitive damages prior in states with a
punitive damages cap and is plotted using only blockbuster cases decided in states with a cap. Additional results may be
found in Table A2 in the Technical Appendix.

The relative effects of State Farm and punitive damages caps on the amount
of punitive damages awarded in blockbuster cases are different from their relative effects on the frequency with which these awards are handed down. Where
both State Farm and caps reduced the frequency of blockbuster awards, only
State Farm reduces the amount of punitive damages awarded, with caps having
no statistically significant effect. The implications of this difference in effects is
discussed in the next Part.
V.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A NEW (EMPIRICAL) CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

Though the Supreme Court has not revisited punitive damages under the
Due Process Clause in the last few years, its case law in this area nonetheless
remains unsettled. 149 In State Farm itself, the Court reversed course from decades of cases in offering something approaching a bright-line, mathematical rule
for punitive damages despite having stated on multiple previous occasions its

149. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) ("We decline again to
impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed.").
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desire to avoid doing so. 5 0 In Exxon Shipping, the Court, while technically analyzing punitive damages under federal maritime law, noted serious reservations
about how punitive damages are imposed. 51 And these reservations were based,
in large part, on the existing empirical evidence. 152 The empirical evidence we
develop in this Article is relevant to the ongoing debate over the most appropriate
way to address punitive damages, and this evidence is particularly helpful in the
context of other empirical evidence on punitive damages. Therefore, we first
place the evidence developed here in the broader context of the existing literature
before making specific recommendations on the best ways to address punitive
damages awards in the future.
The Evidence in Context: Blockbuster and More Typical Awards

A.

Decomposing punitive damages awards into (1) the decision to award punitive damages (or the frequency with which they are awarded) and (2) the decision of what amount of damages to impose, the evidence presented above demonstrates that State Farm affects both of these decisions and punitive damages caps
affect only the first decision. While these results pertain only to blockbuster
awards, McMichael and Viscusi perform a similar analysis using a national sample of punitive damages awards. 15 3 Developing a specific mathematical model of
punitive damages that separately accounts for the two decisions that comprise a
punitive award,1 54 they find that punitive damages caps have no statistically significant effect on the decision of whether to award punitive damages but have a
negative effect on the amount of damages awarded.155 They also find evidence
inconsistent with State Farm having any effect on punitive damages awards.' 5 6
Understanding the divergence in the existing evidence with respect to both
State Farm and state-level reforms can elucidate the best way to address punitive
damages going forward. Beginning with the discrepant effects of punitive damages caps, the best explanation lies in the different types of punitive damages
examined. McMichael and Viscusi consider a national sample of damages,157
while we examine only blockbuster awards here. In theory, punitive damages
caps should affect only the decision of what amount of punitive damages to
award and not the decision of whether to award them because, while caps obviously limit the amount of punitive damages adjudicators may award, they should

150.

State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 ("We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages

award cannot exceed."); see TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993) (disclaiming the
creation of any mathematical formula to govern punitive damages).

151.

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,475-76(2008).

152. Id. at 520.
153. Specifically, McMichael and Viscusi analyze data from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts.
McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 90-92.

154.

Id.

155. Id at 96. They also find consistent evidence that, by not increasing the evidentiary standards for punitive damages, states can expect to see a greater number of punitive damages awards and a higher average award.

Id at 82.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 89.
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not affect the determination of the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct or
whether a defendant deserves to be punished.158 Thus, in the context of the "typical" punitive damages awards considered by McMichael and Viscusi, the noneffect and effect of caps on the decision to impose damages and the decision of
what amount to impose, respectively, is consistent with both the function of caps
59
and the requirements outlined by the Supreme Court.
Why, then, does the evidence presented above follow exactly the opposite
pattern, with caps affecting the frequency of punitive damages but not the amount
awarded? Unlike the sample of awards examined by McMichael and Viscusi, we
focus our attention only on awards that exceed $100 million. This high threshold
explains why caps affect the frequency of blockbuster awards and not the frequency of the more typical awards examined in earlier work. If a cap has a binding effect in a given case, it is exceedingly unlikely that such a case would involve a punitive damages award over $100 million. Thus, the effect of caps on
the frequency of blockbuster awards suggests that caps do, in fact, limit punitive
damages awards by decreasing the chances that any given award will cross the
blockbuster threshold. Similarly, the nature of blockbuster awards (and the high
threshold that must be met to become such an award) explains why caps have
little effect on the amount of damages imposed. Punitive damages caps, almost
invariably, include exceptions that either increase or eliminate the cap in the most
egregious cases. And blockbuster awards are, by definition, the most egregious
cases. Thus, it is not surprising that, conditional on crossing the (very high) $100
million threshold to qualify for blockbuster status, caps have little impact on the
amount of damages awarded.
With respect to the different effect of State Farm, estimated using McMichael and Viscusi's sample of more typical awards and the sample of blockbuster
awards here, the nature of the awards themselves again offers the best explanation. As the Court pointed out in Exxon Shipping, the median and mean ratios
between punitive and compensatory damages are "just 0.62:1 [and] 2.90:1," respectively.1 60 Therefore, the majority of cases do not even begin to approach
State Farm'sratio limit of 10:1, meaning that State Farm generally has no binding effect on the cases analyzed by McMichael and Viscusi.161 In stark contrast,
the median and mean ratios for the blockbuster cases are 7.40:1 and 476.54:1,
respectively.1 6 2 Of the 137 awards we have identified, 44% exceed the State
Farm ratio limit.1 63 Accordingly, it is not surprising that State Farm has a more
salient effect on blockbuster awards since it represents a binding constraint much

158.
factors to
that these
159.

160.
161.

The Supreme Court has made clear that reprehensibility and worthiness of punishment are the relevant
consider when imposing punitive damages, so the lack of an effect of caps on these factors suggests
reforms should not impact the decision of whether to impose punitive damages. Id. at 91.
Id. at 96.

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003); McMichael & Viscusi, The

Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 92.
162. Prior to State Farm, the median and mean ratios were 12.26:1 and 717.66:1, respectively. After State
Farm, the median and mean ratios were 2.04:1 and 14.30:1, respectively.
163. See supra Table 1.
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more often in these cases than in others. Indeed, the median ratio between punitive and compensatory damages decreased from 16.88:1 to 3.76:1 following
State Farm, and the mean ratio decreased from 800.35:1 to 46.66:1.164
Overall, the decrease in the frequency of blockbuster awards attributable to
State Farm occurs for the same reason as it does for punitive damages capsonce constrained, fewer awards are able to cross the blockbuster threshold. With
respect to the amount of punitive damages awarded, however, State Farm contains far fewer exceptions-and possibly no exceptions given the lack of guidance provided by the Supreme Court-than punitive damages caps, meaning that
1 65
it remains a binding constraint even on those awards that exceed $100 million.
The different effects of State Farm and punitive damages caps on different
types of punitive damages awards demonstrates that, depending on the precise
structure of a limitation on punitive damages, that limitation may have very different effects. The next Section explores these different structures and makes a
recommendation on how best to address punitive damages in the future based on
the available empirical evidence.
B.

Clarifyingand Extending the Existing Doctrine

The existing evidence suggests that the structure of a limitation on punitive
damages is important to that limitation's ultimate effect on awards. In particular,
state-level caps are set low enough to constitute a binding constraint on adjudicators awarding punitive damages even in cases where the total amount of damages is not very high. Caps lose their effectiveness in the most egregious cases,
however, because their exceptions inhibit their ability to constrain punitive
awards.' 66 In contrast, the single-digit-ratio limitation announced in State Farm
is not set low enough to bind adjudicators in typical cases where punitive damages awards are not substantially greater than the accompanying compensatory
damages award. State Farm's limitation, however, contains so few exceptions
67
that it represents a binding constraint on even the largest awards.1 These differential effects can be instructive in devising a clearer constitutional doctrine to
govern punitive damages than currently exists under State Farm.
How this should be done depends on whether the losses involve replaceable
financial losses or irreplaceable health impacts, such as fatalities. Specifically,
for financial losses, the Court can achieve its goal of returning predictability to
punitive damages awards by establishing that, only in the rarest cases, may punitive damages exceed compensatory damages by more than three times, i.e.,
establish a 3:1 ratio limit. In the case of irreplaceable losses, such as the loss of
life in a wrongful death case, the pertinent deterrence value is to set the sum of
compensatory damages and punitive damages equal to the value of a statistical

164.
165.

McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 135.
See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426; Del Rossi & Viscusi, supra note 3, at 151.

166.
167.

State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425
Id.
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life.1 68 In this Section, we first describe the legal and empirical justifications for
such limits before offering additional insight into how these limits can contribute
to predictability in punitive damages awards.
Before discussing the specifics of our proposed limits, however, it is important to note that, in establishing these restrictions, the Supreme Court should
abandon all pretext of avoiding a mathematical formula to govern whether a particular punitive damages award is appropriate under the Due Process Clause. 169
The Court nearly did so in State Farm, stating that "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a
significant degree, will satisfy due process." 7 0 In extending State Farmto establish a 3:1 limit, the Court should state that this limit represents a bright-line,
mathematical formula. Our results above suggest that State Farm's success in
limiting blockbuster punitive damages awards is likely traceable to its lack of
exceptions. By extending State Farm to include an actual bright-line rule, the
Court can solidify this paucity of exceptions and ensure that State Farmremains
effective at reducing punitive damages at all levels of awards.' 7 ' The one exception that the doctrine should explicitly include relates to wrongful death and
health-related losses. In particular, the 3:1 limit should apply in cases where no
human was physically harmed or killed. In cases of physical injury or death, the
Court should cap total damages at the value of statistical life. This proposal has
been extensively developed by Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, and we do not
repeat their analysis here. 172 Rather, we incorporate it as a specific exception to
the general 3:1 limit we propose. Importantly, including this exception does not
inhibit the predictability of punitive damages under our proposed doctrine because the value of statistical life is a well-defined formula that can easily be applied by potential defendants when forecasting their potential liability.1 73

168. See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Saving Lives Through Punitive Damages, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 229,
229-30 (2010) [hereinafter Hersch & Viscusi, Saving Lives].
In this Article, we propose a methodology for setting punitive damages in bodily injury cases that will
enable punitive damages to fulfill their proper deterrence role. The primary focus is on wrongful death
cases, but the approach generalizes to other personal injury contexts. The damages structure we propose to
promote efficient levels of safety uses the value of statistical life ("VSL") to establish the punitive damages
award.
Id; see also W. Kip Viscusi, PRICING LIVES: GUIDEPOSTS FOR A SAFER SOCIETY (2018) (discussing the value of
statistical life more generally).

169.

See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (noting that the Court "[could] not draw a

mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would
fit every case").
170. 538 U.S. at 425. But see id. (noting that the Court "decline[d] again to impose a bright-line ratio which
a punitive damages award cannot exceed" despite offering a specific ratio to limit punitive damages).
171. See id. This is not to suggest that there should never be an exception to the rule, and the Court may
well want to include language such as "only the rarest of awards exceeding this ratio will satisfy due process."
This language leaves open the possibility that a clearly egregious case may exceed the limit without offering
instructions on how to do so as state punitive damages caps do.
172. See Hersch & Viscusi, Saving Lives, supra note 168, at 238-42 (discussing the specifics of their proposal).
173. Indeed, federal agencies already incorporate the value of statistical life into their decisions. See Mortality Risk Valuation, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/environmental-economics/mortality-risk-valuation (last visited
Nov. 6, 2018) (describing the EPA's approach to the value of statistical life).
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The Basis for a New ConstitutionalLimit: Exxon Shipping

Turning to the specifics of our proposed limits, the legal foundation of these
limits begins with Exxon Shipping.174 There, the Court faced a similar question
7
of what specific limit to impose, and its approach is instructive here.1' At the
outset, the Court rejected the possibility of eliminating outlying punitive damages awards through verbal instructions or a dollar-amount cap, stating instead
its firm preference for a ratio cap.1 7 6 With respect to that ratio cap, the Court
engaged in a detailed analysis to determine that, under maritime law, punitive
damages could not exceed the accompanying compensatory award, i.e., it im77
posed a 1:1 limit on the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages.' While the
78
Exxon Shipping Court limited its analysis and holding to maritime law,1 its reasoning can easily be extended to the due process context to refine the constitutional limits on punitive damages put in place by State Farm.
In Exxon Shipping, the Court arrived at its final holding with respect to the
1:1 ratio after considering three alternative approaches to limiting punitive damages. 17 9 First, the Court considered using the 3:1 limit that most states had
80
It rejected this apadopted as part of their statutory punitive damages caps.
proach, however, because the states that had implemented such a limit "appl[ied]
[it] across the board."' 8 t The Court was concerned that such a blanket approach
with a relatively high limit of three times compensatory damages was designed
to accommodate too wide a range of cases involving many different types of
conduct. 182 Our proposal is more nuanced than a simple 3:1 limit in that it also
makes provision for establishing deterrence-based damages for cases involving
personal injury. Second, the Court also rejected the 2:1 ratio limit that has become standard in many statutory schemes that allow for the trebling of damages.' 83 In many instances, this limit was based on Congress's desire to induce
private enforcement of statutes by providing financial incentives to potential
plaintiffs," and these concerns were not relevant in the case of punitive damages

174. See generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
175. Id. at 501-02.
176. The Exxon Shipping Court began by rejecting the possibility of eliminating outlying punitive damages
awards through verbal instructions, such as those in pattern jury instructions. Instead, the Court noted its preference for specific, quantitative limits, such as those in the criminal-sentencing context because criminal sentences
seek to achieve the same goals as punitive damages and because these limits offered the best protections against
arbitrary punishments. Id. at 504-08.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 509-13.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 503-07.
Id. at 510.
Id at 510.

182.

Id. ("That is, the upper limit is not directed to cases like this one.").

183.

Id. at 511.

184. Id ("We know, for example, that Congress devised the treble-damages remedy for private antitrust
actions with an eye to supplementing official enforcement by inducing private litigation, which might otherwise
have been too rare if nothing but compensatory damages were available at the end of the day.").
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under maritime law.' 85 Ultimately, the Court decided to rely on empirical evidence in setting the final ratio limit under maritime law.' 86 Noting that the evidence suggested, for all cases, a median ratio of punitive to compensatory damages of less than 1:1,187 the Court reasoned that awards above the median would
be the exceptional ones, such as those involving particularly blameworthy conduct or those with low compensatory awards that nonetheless merit punitive
damages.188 Awards below this level (i.e., the median) would exclude "the unpredictable outlier cases that call the fairness of the system into question."l 89
Accordingly, the Court settled on a 1:1 ratio limit in maritime cases, which it
noted would preclude "awards that are unpredictable and unnecessary, either for
deterrence or for measured retribution." 90
Throughout its opinion in Exxon Shipping, the Court was quite clear that it
was sitting as a common law court of last resort and was, therefore, engaging in
a somewhat different analysis than it had when examining punitive damages under the Constitution.19' Nonetheless, the Court's general approach to punitive
damages under maritime law can, with relatively slight modifications, provide
the framework for extending State Farm to better address the predictability of
punitive damages under the Due Process Clause. The Court specifically sought
to achieve the same goals in Exxon Shipping as it has in its line of Due Process
cases, namely the elimination of arbitrary, unfair, and unpredictable awards.1 92
185. Id. at 512 ("All in all, the legislative signposts do not point the way clearly to 2:1 as a sound indication
of a reasonable limit.").

186.

Id. at 512-13.

187.

This evidence was developed by Eisenberg et al., EmpiricalAnalyses, supra note 98, at 276.

188.

Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 512-13.

In a well-functioning system, we would expect that awards at the median or lower would roughly express
jurors' sense of reasonable penalties in cases with no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness within the
punishable spectrum (cases like this one, without intentional or malicious conduct, and without behavior
driven primarily by desire for gain, for example) and cases (again like this one) without the modest economic harm or odds of detection that have opened the door to higher awards.

Id.
189.
190.
191.

Id.at513.
Id.
Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 501-02.

Today's enquiry differs from due process review because the case arises under federal maritime jurisdiction,
and we are reviewing a jury award for conformity with maritime law, rather than the outer limit allowed by
due process; we are examining the verdict in the exercise of federal maritime common law authority....
Our review of punitive damages today, then, considers not their intersection with the Constitution, but the
desirability of regulating them as a common law remedy for which responsibility lies with this Court as a
source of judge-made law in the absence of statute.

Id.
192.

Id at 499.

The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards. Courts of law are concemed
with fairness as consistency, and evidence that the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards falls
within a reasonable zone, or that punitive awards are infrequent, fails to tell us whether the spread between
high and low individual awards is acceptable.

Id.
While States possess discretion over the imposition ofpunitive damages, it is well established that there are
procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards.... The reason is that "[e]lementary
notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not
only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State
may impose."
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And by modifying its approach in Exxon Shipping to suit the due process context,
the Court can achieve predictability in all punitive damages cases without fatally
undermining the ability of punitive damages to punish and deter reprehensible
conduct.
2.

Choosing the AppropriateLimit

Returning to the Exxon Shipping Court's three alternatives to limit punitive
damages, it chose the final alternative of a 1:1 ratio based on empirical evidence
because this ratio would exclude many cases that involved particularly blameworthy conduct. 19 3 While such a goal seems perfectly permissible in the context
of maritime law,1 9 4 excluding large punitive damages awards warranted by particularly blameworthy conduct would be a step too far in the due process context.
Indeed, punishing particularly blameworthy conduct with a large punitive damages award (or, at least, a large award relative to the accompanying compensatory award) is consistent with the purposes of punitive damages.1 95 Thus, categorically prohibiting large awards of punitive damages would not be appropriate.
As to the second alternative, the Court rejected imposing a 2:1 limit on the ratio
between punitive and compensatory damages based on statutory frameworks allowing for the trebling of damages because the purpose of damages-treblinginducing greater private enforcement of specific statutes-was not relevant in
the context of maritime law. 196 Nothing in the constitutional context differs from
the maritime context in a way that would suggest applying a 2:1 limit in the former when it was inappropriate in the latter.
That leaves only the first alternative considered by the Exxon Shipping
Court-the 3:1 ratio that was favored by the majority of states that had enacted
a punitive damages cap. 197 While the Exxon Shipping Court rejected this alternative as inappropriate under maritime law,1 98 two compelling reasons support applying it in the due process context. First, this limitation is strongly supported by
the existing empirical evidence,1 99 including the evidence presented here. State
Farm's 10:1 ratio limit has generally failed to affect typical punitive damages
awards but has had a substantial and negative influence on blockbuster awards.200
Conversely, state punitive damages caps, which the Court correctly noted are

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2003) (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)).
193. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 510-13.
194. Id. at 490.
195. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 ("Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.").
196. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 511.
197. Id. at 510 ("[T]he upper limit is not directed to cases like this one, where the tortious action was worse
than negligent but less than malicious, exposing the tortfeasor to certain regulatory sanctions and inevitable damages actions.").

198.

Id. at 511-12.

199. McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 93-94.
200. See generally Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 14; Viscusi & McMichael, Shiling the Fat-Tailed Distribution, supra note 3.
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often centered on a 3:1 ratio but have multiple exceptions, reduce the amount of
punitive damages awarded in typical cases but not blockbuster cases. 201 By reducing State Farm'sratio limit to 3:1 for financial losses while maintaining few
exceptions, particularly those for personal injury and wrongful death cases, the
Court can ensure that the constitutional limit on punitive damages is binding in
a wider array of cases.
Second, the Court in Exxon Shipping expressed its strong support for a ratio
limit based on empirical evidence.2 02 Not only do the regression results above
and from other work support a 3:1 ratio limit, but the raw data from blockbuster
awards similarly support such a limitation. In Exxon Shipping, the Court chose a
1:1 ratio because it excluded the most egregious cases based on particularly
blameworthy conduct. 2 0 3 Eliminating large punitive awards across all case types
under the Due Process Clause would not be appropriate because doing so would
eviscerate the ability of punitive damages to achieve the goals of punishing and
deterring blameworthy conduct. A 3:1 ratio, however, is obviously higher than a
1:1 ratio and so would still allow many cases involving particularly blameworthy
conduct to pass constitutional muster. More importantly, as an empirical matter,
our proposed 3:1 ratio is remarkably close to the median ratio of 3.76:1 observed
in blockbuster cases following State Farm.20 4 Thus, imposing a 3:1 ratio in the
due process context is justified for the same reasons as imposing a 1:1 ratio in
the more limited maritime context is-it eliminates the unpredictable, outlying
awards while still permitting awards that are designed to punish and deter. 2 0 5
Blockbuster cases involve the most egregious conduct, so limiting punitive damages based on the median blockbuster ratio effectively screens out the most egregious of the most egregious, consistent with the reasoning of Exxon Shipping and
the more general goals of State Farm.20 6
Overall, there is no legal impediment to importing the reasoning from
Exxon Shipping to the due process context, as the Court in both the maritime and
due process contexts has been concerned with the predictability of punitive damages awards.20 7 And imposing a 3:1 ratio under the Due Process Clause is supported by similarly strong, if not stronger, empirical evidence as that which supported the imposition of a 1:1 ratio in maritime law.20 8 While this limit will
necessarily inhibit the ability of punitive damages to punish and deter in limited
instances, the Court has made clear the importance of predictability in addressing
large punitive damages awards. 2 0 9 The next Subsection offers additional insight,

201.

McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra note 14, at 94.

202.
203.

Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 511-13.
Id. at 513.

204.
205.

Id at 515.
Id. at 513.

206.

Id. at 512-13; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425-26 (2003).

207.

Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 507.
Id. at 506-07.
209. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425 (noting that awards satisfying a ratio limit are more likely to comport with
due process "while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence and retribution").

208.

No. 1]

TAMING BLOCKBUSTER PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS

215

based on previously developed evidence, as to why our proposed 3:1 ratio limit
will improve the predictability of punitive damages awards.
3.

But Will It Work?: Improving Predictability

In one of the earliest empirical entries in the debate over punitive damages,
Eisenberg and colleagues claimed that these damages may be predictable because the amount of compensatory damages provided substantial explanatory
power as to the amount of punitive damages. 2 10 Polinsky pointed out, however,
that even if the amount of compensatory damages explained the amount of punitive damages, an "inability to predict when ... punitive damages will be
awarded" means that these damages remain unpredictable. 2 1 1 Polinsky is correct
that predicting punitive damages involves predicting both when they will be
awarded and the amount in which they will be awarded. Moreover, the amount
of compensatory damages is not known in advance at the time of the wrongful
conduct. Thus, even if the level of compensatory damages has a positive statistical correlation with the value of punitive damages, the injurer must be able to
predict both the level of compensatory damages and its relation to subsequent
punitive damages in order to determine the expected liability costs. Existing evidence suggests that both State Farm and punitive damages caps can reduce the
randomness in this process by decreasing the frequency with which punitive
damages are awarded and the size of the awards that are imposed.212 And, as
explained above, reducing the State Farm ratio limit to more closely approximate
those found in state punitive damages caps will provide for even stronger effects
across the entire range of punitive damages awards. 2 13 While reducing the frequency and size of awards does not technically render punitive damages more
predictable on Polinksy's terms, these reductions can nonetheless play an important role in facilitating the predictability of punitive damages.
In particular, blockbuster punitive damages awards follow a fat-tailed distribution in which there are extreme outliers at the upper end of the damages
scale.2 14 Accordingly, extremely large awards are much more common than if
these awards followed a normal distribution. 2 15 Moreover, at the highest end of
the spectrum, the largest awards can dwarf the next largest awards.2 16 These aspects of fat-tailed distributions make predicting large punitive damages awards
exceedingly difficult, and a reduction in the size of these awards alone (even if
unaccompanied by an increase in the ability to predict when they will occur)
makes them inherently more predictable. 2 17 Viscusi and McMichael compare

210.

Eisenberg et al., Predictability ofPunitive Damages, supra note 87, at 646.

211.

Polinsky, supra note 86, at 672.

212. See supra Subsection m.B; see also McMichael & Viscusi, The Punitive Damages Calculus, supra
note 14, at 93-95.
213. See supra Section V.B.
214. Viscusi & McMichael, Shifting the Fat-Tailed Distribution, supra note 3, at 354-55.

215. Id.
216. Id
217. Id. at 376.
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these awards to natural disasters, which also follow fat-tailed distributions. 2 18
Continuing this analogy, consider predicting the yearly damage caused by hurricanes. Even if one's ability to predict when hurricanes will occur remains unchanged, a decrease in the severity of these hurricanes will naturally render predicting the yearly damage caused by hurricanes easier. This is precisely the type
of reduction-and commensurate increase in predictability-offered by extending the State Farm decision to impose a 3:1 ratio limit on punitive damages
awards. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Gore recognized this type of increase in
predictability, noting that "[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice . .. of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose." 219 Our proposed ratio limit can
achieve exactly this.
The 3:1 ratio limit, combined with a well-defined exception for wrongful
death cases, may be broadly consistent with economic theories of punitive damages in which punitive damages are linked to the probability of detection. Although the courts have shown no inclination to embrace this law and economics
theory,220 our proposal is consistent with making some adjustment for a probability of detection below 1.0. Under the economic theory of punitive damages,
total damages should equal the level of compensatory damages divided by the
probability of detection.2 21 If the probability of detection is 0.25, then total damages should equal four times the value of compensatory damages, which is what
the 3:1 ratio limit for punitive damages achieves. If the probability of detection
is higher than 0.25, then a 3:1 ratio will lead to larger punitive damages than
specified by the theory. If the probability of detection is lower than 0.25, such as
0.1, then the 3:1 ratio limit would result in lower punitive damages than specified
by the economic theory. Thus, the ratio limit is only excessively constraining for
very low probabilities of detection. Attempting to pinpoint the probability of detection and incorporating it into the punitive damages formula may introduce
additional uncertainty into a damages proposal that is designed to decrease unpredictability. Given that the case has been brought to trial, the wrongful conduct
has been detected ex post with complete certainty. Ascertaining the probability
of detection that the wrongdoer anticipated at the time of the wrongful conduct
is typically not known with precision and is likely to be a highly speculative

218.

Id. at 355.

219.

517 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).

220. Courts have clearly demonstrated their awareness of the economic theory of punitive damages-specifically with respect to the need to increase punitive damages to compensate for a low probability of detection

and liability. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 494 (2008) ("Regardless of culpability, however,
heavier punitive awards have been thought to be justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect (increasing

chances of getting away with it)."); BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) ("A higher ratio
may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect."). Despite calls from respected scholars,
however, such as Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 23, at 957-58, courts have declined to bring judicial practice
in line with economic theory. See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 495-96 (reviewing various approaches to addressing punitive damages with no mention of employing economic theory).

221.

Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 23, at 874.
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exercise. 222 Establishing a 3:1 ratio cap promotes greater predictability with respect to punitive damages, while also accommodating some aspects of the more
general law and economics theory of punitive damages.
VI. CONCLUSION

While the Court has not revisited its constitutional doctrine on punitive
damages in several years, these damages awards continue to play an important
role in the legal system. By allowing courts to punish reprehensible behavior and
better achieve the optimal level of deterrence, they can more closely align the
damages in a given case with society's interests. When improperly calibrated,
however, punitive damages can become unpredictable and ultimately violate fundamental notions of fairness. Many blockbuster awards are good examples of
this problem, as courts impose large amounts of punitive damages on defendants
who have little ability to predict that their activity will lead to such extreme punishment.
This Article provides important, novel information on the ways in which
different legal regimes affect blockbuster awards. State Farm, and its single-digit
ratio, reduce both the frequency and size of blockbuster awards, while state punitive damages caps reduce only the frequency-most likely by preventing
awards that would otherwise have qualified as blockbusters from crossing the
$100 million threshold. While this evidence offers new insight into blockbuster
awards generally, when combined with previous evidence, it offers a unique opportunity to examine which interventions into punitive damages awards are most
effective.
Using this insight, we propose a new approach to governing punitive damages awards under the Due Process Clause. Specifically, by lowering the current
ratio limit from 10:1 to 3:1, coupled with an exception for wrongful death cases,
the Court can realize the benefits of the current doctrine with respect to the largest awards as well as the benefits of punitive damages caps with respect to more
typical awards. Though our proposed doctrine will limit the ability of punitive
damages to punish and deter, the Court has made clear that it is willing to trade
off accomplishing these goals to achieve more predictability in punitive damages
awards. Overall, the evidence suggests that incorporating more elements from

222. Indeed, Viscusi conducted a series of experiments in which potential jurors were provided with instructions on how to set punitive damages consistent with economic theory so that the total amount of damages
would achieve optimal deterrence. W. Kip Viscusi, DeterrenceInstructions: What Jurors Won't Do, in PUNITIVE
DAMAGES How JUlIES DECIDE 142, 143 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002). However, "[v]ery few of the 353
jury-eligible respondents in [the] sample carried out the basic elements of the deterrence calculation, even though
they had the assistance of a table that gave them multipliers for translating compensatory damages values into
deterrence values." Id. Moreover, "[r]espondents were very insensitive to changes in the probability of detecting
a violation, which should have been the key concern for setting deterrence values based on law and economics
principles," and "respondents were not sensitive to the degree of stealthiness of the defendant's behavior, which
should have been a pivotal factor influencing the punishment value for damages." Id. Thus, even if courts were
inclined to operationalize the economic theory of punitive damages, the process of calculating punitive damages
would be, at best, speculative.
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state punitive damages caps into the constitutional doctrine on punitive damages
can better achieve the aims laid out by the Supreme Court.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX

Specification and Other Details
To estimate the effect of state reforms on the frequency of blockbuster
awards, we use the following specification:
(1) (Blockbuster case count)st = fl 1(State Farm)t + (Punitive reforms)st
+3 (Time trend)t + 8s + E.

2

In this equation, Blockbuster case count is the number of blockbuster
awards in state s in year t. We control for the effect State Farm may have had on
the number of blockbuster awards across the country. The State Farm indicator
assumes a value of 1 for the year 2004 and all subsequent years. While it was
actually decided in 2003, we allow a grace period to allow for the full implementation of the decision by lower courts. The vector (Punitivereforms) includes
indicators for the following reforms: punitive damages cap, punitive evidence
reform, and bifurcated trial. (Time trend) is a linear time trend to control for the
growth of punitive damages awards over time. We also include a series of indicators for states, 8, to control for state fixed effects.
To examine the effect of state reforms on the amount of blockbuster punitive damages awarded at trial, we use the following specification:

+

(2) log(PD)it = fl, log(compensatory damages)ist +fl 2 (State Farm)t
fl3 (PD Cap) + f 4 Benchit + (Industry)stfls
fl 6 (Litigant Type)ist + (State)stf 7

+

E.

In this specification log(PD) is the natural logarithm of the punitive damages awarded in a given case. Similarly, log(compensatory damages) is the natural logarithm of the compensatory damages in a given case. The indicator variables State Farm and PD Cap are the variables of interest and equal one when a
case was decided after State Farmand when a case was subject to a state punitive
damages cap, respectively. In addition to including the indicator variables, we
estimate separate models with an interaction between the compensatory damages
variable and these indicator variables. We sequentially add the variables of interest to different models in order to test the robustness of our results.
Bench is an indicator for a bench trial. The vector Industry includes indicator variables for the following industries of defendants: automobile, tobacco, finance/investment/insurance, energy/chemical, pharmaceutical/health industries,
and violent crime. While violent crime is obviously not an industry, we control
for whether the case involved the defendant committing some sort of crime. Litigant type is an indicator for whether both business and individual litigants were
involved in a case. The vector State includes indicators for California and Texas
since these states are associated with relatively more frequent and relatively
larger awards.
Throughout our analysis, we exclude four cases from the blockbuster regressions. First, we exclude the two largest cases as outliers: Middleton v. Collins
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and Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco. Additionally, we exclude Garamendiv. Altus Finance, S.A. and Chopourian v. Catholic Healthcare West because the
courts in these cases awarded no compensatory damages, rendering the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages undefined.
In unreported specifications, we include indicator variables for whether a
state allowed or required bifurcated trials (such that punitive damages are
awarded in a separate phase of trial) and whether a state maintained a lower evidentiary burden for punitive damages. These variables are never statistically
significant themselves, and including them has little effect on the variables of
interest.
Results Tables
TABLE Al: EFFECT OF STATEFARMAND PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAPS
ON AWARD FREQUENCY (BLOCKBUSTER CASE COUNT)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Variables

State Farm

-0.138**

-0.146***

-0.119**

(0.0558)

(0.0560)

(0.0568)

-0.0850**

-0.0997***

-0.100***

(0.0342)

(0.0339)

(0.0352)

Punitive damages cap
Punitive damages
evidence reform

0.114***
(0.0381)

Bifurcated Trial

-0.0341
(0.0425)

Observations
R-squared

957

957

957

957

0.249

0.244

0.252

0.257

*

Notes: All columns report OLS regression results with the number of blockbuster punitive damages awards in a given
state in a given year as the dependent variable. All specifications include a linear time trend and a full set of state indicator
variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level;
significant at 10% level.
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A2: EFFECT OF STATEFARMAND
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAPS ON

AWARD AMOUNTS (LOG PD)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Variables
State Farm

-0.621*

-0.622*

(0.324)

(0.327)

log(CD) x State
Farm
0.00661

PD Cap

(0.221)

-0.0363**

0.0363**

(0.0178)

(0.0180)

-0.0158
(0.215)
0.000343

log(CD) x PD Cap

(0.0121)
log(CD)

0.186***
(0.0503)

Observations
R-squared

0.166***
(0.0514)

0.185***

0.200***

0.166***

(0.0502)

(0.0516)

(0.0517)

0.000518
(0.0116)
0.200***
(0.0520)

133

133

133

133

133

133

0.335

0.310

0.335

0.338

0.310

0.338

Notes: All columns report OLS regression results with the natural log of punitive damages as the dependent variable. All
awards are in 2013 dollars. All specifications include an indicator for business and individual litigants, a vector of indicators for different industries, and indicators for whether a case was decided in Texas or in California. The industry vector
includes indicator variables for the following industries of defendants: automobile, tobacco, finance/investment/insurance, energy/chemical, pharmaceutical/health industries, and violent crime. The excluded industry category is other industry. All specifications exclude the Garamendiand Chopouriancases which involved no compensatory damages and
the Engle and Middleton cases which involved the two largest PD Awards in the dataset. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
,** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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